The trial court in this child-protective proceeding did not “articulate an adequate basis or make sufficient factual findings to justify its denial of jurisdiction” over the minor child, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded In re D A Rosporski, Minor (Docket No. 364869) “for appropriate findings of fact and an articulation of a jurisdictional analysis that is amenable to appellate review.”

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the Wayne County Circuit Court, requesting that it take jurisdiction over the minor child, DAR, and remove him from the respondent-father’s care based on allegations of sexual abuse. The trial court conducted an adjudicative trial and took jurisdiction over DAR. When the respondent-father filed a motion for reconsideration of the original adjudicative order, the trial court held it was established by a preponderance of the evidence that no statutory grounds existed to take jurisdiction over DAR. Therefore, the trial court vacated its prior order and dismissed the DHHS’s petition.

The DHHS appealed, arguing the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate the basis for its decision and did not make adequate factual findings that would enable a meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeals agreed. “The court’s analysis leaves a record inadequate for appellate review and remand is necessary to correct the trial court’s omissions. Therefore, while retaining jurisdiction, we remand this matter to the trial court for appropriate findings of fact and an articulation of its jurisdictional analysis.”

Judge Jane E. Markey, Judge Stephen L. Borrello and Judge Kristina Robinson Garrett were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Analysis Must Be ‘Articulated’

On appeal, the DHHS asserted the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the respondent-father’s motion for reconsideration because he did not demonstrate “palpable error” and “merely presented the same issue for reconsideration already determined at trial.”

The Court of Appeals addressed this argument by explaining that motions for reconsideration in child-protective proceedings are governed by MCR 3.992 and MCR 2.119. “MCR 3.992(A) provides that ‘[a] motion will not be considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented to the court, or presented, but not previously considered by the court, which, if true, would cause the court to reconsider the case.’ MCR 2.119(F)(3) provides: Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from correction of the error.’”

The Court of Appeals pointed out that it “has long recognized that the court rules allow a court to correct an error in its original analysis …. We have also held that the palpable error provision in MCR 2.119(F)(3) is not mandatory, but ‘provides guidance to a court about when it may be appropriate to consider a motion for rehearing or reconsideration.’”

Michigan child-protective proceedings include 1) the adjudicative phase and 2) the dispositional phase, the Court of Appeals noted. “Following a trial, the court may exercise jurisdiction if the DHHS proves ‘by a preponderance of the evidence one or more of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction alleged in the petition.’”

Here, the DHHS had asked the trial court to assume jurisdiction over DAR under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). “The DHHS asserts that the trial court erred by granting respondent-father’s motion for reconsideration because respondent-father did not establish a palpable error by which the court and the parties were misled,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “The DHHS also accuses respondent-father of presenting the same issue in his reconsideration motion that the court addressed at trial.” However, “[c]ontrary to the DHHS’s argument, respondent-father’s motion did not merely request that the court reconsider the same issue already decided at trial. Rather, the record suggests that the trial court did not review certain pieces of respondent-father’s evidence before issuing its adjudicative decision.”

The respondent-father contended that various documents, along with other evidence admitted at trial, demonstrated a “lack of evidence” that he sexually abused DAR, the Court of Appeals observed. “At trial, respondent-father did not call any witnesses, but moved to admit these documents at the close of proofs. The court admitted the exhibits and the parties proceeded to closing arguments. In respondent-father’s closing, he referenced these documents. The court then issued its oral ruling finding that DAR came within its jurisdiction. However, there was no indication that the court reviewed the 2015 [guardian ad litem] report or the related court order before issuing its decision. Indeed, it is unclear how such a review would have been possible considering how rapidly the matter moved from entry of the exhibits to closing arguments to the rendering of a decision, given the length of the documents and the fact that the court did not recess before issuing its decision. Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion that, rather than presenting the same issue for reconsideration, respondent-father was imploring the court to review all of the admitted evidence, including the evidence that was not previously considered.”

Moreover, the respondent-father was not required to demonstrate palpable error, the Court of Appeals said. “The court was permitted, in its discretion, to give the jurisdictional issue a ‘second chance’ and did not err by choosing to reevaluate its previous decision. …Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it agreed to entertain respondent-father’s motion for reconsideration.”

However, “[w]e conclude … that the trial court erred when it reissued its order of adjudication without making adequate findings of fact or articulating the basis for its decision to permit meaningful appellate review,” the Court of Appeals stated. “In its second jurisdictional decision, the trial court did not explain why, after reconsidering the evidence, it determined that the evidentiary record did not warrant the assumption of jurisdiction. Beyond cursorily asserting that it found it ‘more likely than not that the father did not commit a sexual act’ on DAR, and ‘that the physical abuse that father admitted to, does not rise to the level for this Court to be involved,’ the trial court failed to point to any specific evidence, nor make findings of fact or credibility determinations to reveal how it resolved the jurisdictional issue. A trial court’s findings need not be extensive.”

As a result, the trial court’s conclusion, “especially in light of its previous findings that there was a preponderance of evidence to support jurisdiction, provides little in terms of facilitating meaningful appellate review,” the Court of Appeals said. “This is all the more apparent given that we must review the trial court’s decision for clear error considering the court’s findings of fact. … The court’s analysis leaves a record inadequate for appellate review and remand is necessary to correct the trial court’s omissions. Therefore, while retaining jurisdiction, we remand this matter to the trial court for appropriate findings of fact and an articulation of its jurisdictional analysis.”