In re KNK, Minor

• Opinion Published: 10/07/2024

• Docket No. 370841

• Lapeer Circuit Court

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s order declining to authorize DHHS’s petition for child protective proceedings on the basis that the Trial Court could not take jurisdiction because the minor child is protected under a no-contact order with Respondent and the minor child is living in a fit home environment with the non-respondent mother, who has been protecting the minor child and meeting her needs.

Facts: Respondent is the father of the minor child, KK. In March 2024, petitioner DHHS filed a petition for child protective proceedings requesting that the Trial Court take jurisdiction over KK pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), and enter an order removing Respondent from the home and placing KK in her mother’s care. The petition alleged that Respondent took photos or videos of KK while she was undressed in the shower, as well as surveilled and inappropriately touched another child of his, MK, when MK was a minor. Due to these allegations, Respondent was criminally charged and arraigned before Petitioner filed the petition. The conditions of Respondent’s bond included a no-contact order between him and KK.  

The Trial Court found that there was probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition were true and supported an exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). However, the Trial Court declined to authorize the petition due to the lack of need for the Court’s involvement at the time. In issuing its opinion, the Trial Court made an oral statement and also released a written opinion. In the oral statement, the Trial Court stated that the allegations supported the exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).  The Trial Court also said in its oral opinion that it does not have endless time and resources, and because KK is protected under the no-contact order, issuing another order will not accomplish anything further. The Trial Court stated in its written order that due to the no-contact order, there was no threat to KK; further, KK’s needs were being met with a removal and Respondent and the home environment was fit, so it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the Court to take jurisdiction. Petitioner then appealed.

Key Appellate Rulings: 

Without specific evidence to show a substantial risk of harm to a child’s mental or emotional well-being, the mere fact that a parent is charged with criminal conduct against a child does is not enough to find that a DHHS petition should be authorized. 

The Court of Appeals has recognized that a respondent’s incarceration combined with the child's safe placement in the custody of another parent does not obviate the risk of mental or emotional harm to a child victimized by the incarcerated parent. In re Ramsey, 229 Mich App 310, 315; 581 NW2d 291 (1998). However, In re Ramsey did not “set forth a bright-line rule requiring a finding of a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental well-being anytime the respondent is charged with violent conduct against the child.” In re Leach, __Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2023) (Docket Nos. 362618 and 362621), slip op at 4. Just because a respondent is charged with criminal conduct against a child does not require a finding that the child is at substantial risk of mental or emotional harm. Id.  

In this case, the petition did not request removal of KK from the home, but rather sought an order removing Respondent from the home and placing KK in the mother’s care and custody. Petitioner did not present any evidence to show that KK was at substantial risk of harm within the meaning of MCL 712A.2(b)(1) at the time the petition was filed, nor did Petitioner show that existing mental or emotional harm existed, or a substantial risk of that harm arising. Thus, despite Respondent’s status as having been incarcerated, the Trial Court did not clearly err by finding that it was not necessary or appropriate to take jurisdiction over KK and declining to authorize the petition on that basis.

Justifying authorization of a petition is not the same as mandating authorization of a petition. 

Petitioner argued that a trial court’s finding of probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true and fall within the jurisdictional provisions of MCL 712A.13a(2) justifies a trial court’s authorization of a petition. However, the Court of Appeals highlighted the language of MCL 712A.13a(2), with states that a trial court “may authorize the petition upon a showing of probable cause” that the allegations are true and fall within the statutory provisions for jurisdiction. MCL 712A.13a(2) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals looked to legislative intent to determine that the use of the word “may” was intentional, noting that the word choice “signifies that it intended to permit, but not require, a trial court to authorize a petition upon a finding of probable cause.” Further, the Court of Appeals emphasized the Legislature’s contemplation that there would be circumstances where probable cause is found, but a trial court would nonetheless need to decline to authorize the petition. This language permitted the Trial Court to decline to authorize Petitioner’s petition despite the finding that there was probable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition are true and fall within the jurisdictional provisions of MCL 712A.13a(2).

When a Trial Court issues opinions in the form of both oral and written statements, the written findings control. 

Though the Trial Court initially stated that the allegations supported the exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), it subsequently found in its written order that KK’s home environment was fit. In relying on In re Contempt of Henry, the Court of Appeals held that a court speaks through its written orders and judgments rather than its oral pronouncements, so to the extent that a trial court’s oral and written findings conflict, the written findings control. In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 678; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). Therefore, the Trial Court’s finding from the written opinion that the allegations in the petitions did not support the statutory provisions for jurisdiction controls. 

In addition, Petitioner argued that the Trial Court erred by considering the Court’s resources in declining to authorize the petition. However, the Court of Appeals recognized that the Trial Court did not make mention of this in its written opinion, and because the Trial Court specified that its comments regarding resources were only comments and not the basis of the decision, the Court of Appeals held that Petitioner has not established that the Trial Court considered its judicial resources in determining whether to authorize the petition.