Kidder v. Pobursky-Kidder

• Opinion Published February 22, 2024 (Patel, P.J., and K.F. Kelley and Riordan, JJ.)

• Court of Appeals Docket No. 365527 

• Authored by Judge Patel 

• Jordan Ahlers of the Speaker Law Firm represented Appellant-Husband

Holding: The framework for calculating reasonable attorney fees under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Smith v. Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 530; 751 NW2d 472 (2008), and Pirgu v. USAA, 499 Mich 269, 281-282; 884 NW2d 257 (2016), applies to sanctions under MCR 1.109. Because the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did follow the Smith/Pirgu framework, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  

Facts: In these post-Judgment of Divorce proceedings, the trial court sanctioned Husband for filing pleadings that it determined violated MCR 1.109. Husband was ordered to pay Wife reasonable attorney fees for responding to these pleadings. Husband appealed the trial court’s original decision to sanction him, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  

Wife requested $57,221.40 in attorney fees. In support of this request, Wife filed a 24-page Bill of Costs that contained an itemized list of the legal services provided and the rates charged. Husband objected to the request on the grounds that many of the charges were “exaggerated, excessive, and unreasonable,” and he requested an evidentiary hearing on the award. During the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated to postpone the trial court’s decision while Husband’s appeal was pending. Following the appeal, the trial court found that Wife’s request of $57,221.40 was reasonable except for a minor decrease of $212.50. Accordingly, the trial court sanctioned Husband $57,008.90 in attorney fees. Husband appealed.  

Key Appellate Ruling:  

The Smith/Pirgu framework for calculating reasonable attorney fees applies to sanctions of reasonable attorney fees under MCR 1.109(E)(6).  

As an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals applied the Smith/Pirgu reasonable attorney fee framework to MCR 1.109 sanctions. Under Smith/Pirgu, when a court determines a figure of reasonable attorney fees, the court must first determine a reasonable hourly rate. The court must then multiply the reasonably hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours to determine a baseline figure. Finally, the court must consider the remaining factors under MRPC 1.5(a) to determine if it should depart from the baseline. 

According to the Court of Appeals, the trial court correctly determined the hourly rates of Wife’s trial attorneys were reasonable. Further, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly multiplied the hourly rates by its determination of a reasonable number of hours to find a baseline figure. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not deviate from this baseline.