In re Estate of Terry L. Seybert 

• Opinion Published: 01/20/2022

• Judge M.J. Kelly, Author; and Judges P.J. Cameron and JJ Shapiro on panel 

• Docket No. 355647

• Kalamazoo County Probate Court 

• Jordan Ahlers, of the Speaker Law Firm, represented Appellant 

Holding: The Trial Court erred when it compelled Appellant-Parker to provide a DNA sample to establish that Appellee-Wise was the biological son of decedent-Seybert because the Paternity Act expressly authorizes the court to compel DNA from three individuals, none of whom are the Appellant. 

Facts: Seybert died intestate in 2019 and his body was cremated. Seybert’s daughter, Parker, was appointed successor personal representative. Wise filed an ex parte petition for a temporary restraining order, alleging that he was an heir of Seybert. At the hearing on the matter, Wise asserted that he was provided information that led him to believe he was Seybert’s son. Seybert’s mother, brother, and Wise provided DNA samples which revealed a “99.8 percent probability” that a relationship existed between Seybert and Wise. The probate court then held an evidentiary hearing and ordered that Parker not make distributions from the estate until there was a determination on the paternity issue. Wise then moved to compel Parker to also submit genetic testing arguing that there was no remaining genetic material of Seybert, and the samples provided by Seybert’s mother and brother were inconclusive in determining if Wise was Seybert’s child. The probate court granted Wise’s motion, and Parker appealed. 

Key Appellate Rulings:

1. The trial court erred in ordering Parker to provide a DNA sample because the Paternity Act, MCL 722.715(1), provides that a trial court shall order the mother, child, or alleged father to submit DNA samples to establish paternity, none of which apply to Parker. 
   
   Under the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) MCL 700.1101(1)(b)(v) provides that “the court with jurisdiction over probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate determines that the man is the child’s father, using the standards and procedures established under the paternity act . . . .” The Paternity Act then establishes in MCL 722.716(1) that “in a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, . . . shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father” to submit DNA samples to determine “whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child . . . .”  
   
   Parker argued that, since the Paternity Act only authorizes a trial court to order the child, mother, and alleged father to provide a DNA sample, the probate court could not use the Paternity Act to order her to provide a DNA sample. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that there was no language in the Paternity Act that authorized a trial court to order the father’s other children to provide DNA samples. Further, because the statute expressly named those three individuals, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court is precluded from ordering testing from other individuals not named in the statute.  
   
   The Trial Court relied on In re Jones Estate and Wise relied on In re Koehler Estate to support his claim, both of which the Court of Appeals held are not controlling on this issue. In re Jones Estate held that, while additional DNA samples could be utilized in determining paternity, the Court did not determine that it could require other individuals outside of those stated in MCL 722.716(1) to submit DNA samples. Further, In re Koehler Estate ruled that voluntarily submitted DNA samples could be considered when determining paternity, but additional DNA samples could not be required. 
   
   This Court ruled that a probate court may utilize “the standards and procedures established” under the Paternity Act to determine paternity of a decedent, but the Paternity Act does not allow a court to order any person other than the mother, child, or alleged father to provide a DNA sample. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court clearly erred in granting Wise’s motion to compel.  

2. Even if the Paternity Act did not prohibit the probate court from ordering Parker to provide a DNA sample, the trial court could not order Parker to provide a DNA sample because Wise did not have a legal basis for his request to compel.
   
   Wise alleged that a sample could be compelled under either MCR 2.310(B)(1) or MCR 2.311. However, the Court noted that the court rules do not control situations specifically addressed by statute. Because the Paternity Act specifically addresses which individuals can be ordered to provide DNA testing, the court rules cannot be used as a sufficient legal basis to overrule the plain language of the statute.  

3. Even if the court rules could be used to require genetic testing, the Court of Appeals held that neither MCR 2.310(B) nor MCR 2.311 provide a sufficient legal basis to do so. 
   
   The Court held that a request to submit a DNA sample does not fall within the more general scope of MCR 2.310(B)(1), so the Court determined that MCR 2.311 is the only one of the two argued court rules that could potentially be applicable in this case. MCR 2.311 addresses instances where a party could be compelled to submit to a physical examination, and MC 2.311(A) allows for such an examination when the party’s mental or physical condition is at issue. However, Parker’s mental or physical condition was never at issue, so the Court of Appeals ruled that Wise could not compel Parker to provide a DNA sample under MCR 2.311(A).