The Michigan Supreme Court has vacated certain parts of a 2021 Court of Appeals decision affirming a trial court’s finding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant-father in a child support case.  

In a July 10, 2023 order, the Supreme Court vacated Parts II(A)(2) and II(B) of the Court of Appeals opinion in Hilyard v Johnston (Docket No. 163501). Rather than granting leave to appeal in the case, the justices held the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the Ingham County Circuit Court’s ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant-father under Michigan’s long-arm statute.

The Supreme Court ordered the trial court “to conduct a proper minimum contacts analysis in order to determine whether the trial court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the [defendant] for the purpose of enforcing the out-of-state child support order in Michigan.”

Justice Brian K. Zahra and Justice Richard H. Bernstein indicated they would have denied leave to appeal in the case.

Background

The plaintiff and the defendant divorced in New York in 2005. The defendant was ordered to pay child support. In 2010, the plaintiff moved to Michigan with the children.

When the parties’ youngest child turned 18, the defendant refused to pay any further child support based on an alleged oral agreement to stop support at that time. The plaintiff then registered the New York child support order in the Ingham County Circuit Court and tried to enforce it. The Ingham County trial court ruled that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and that it had wrongly registered the New York support order. The trial court dismissed the enforcement action.

The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unpublished opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that MCL 552.2301(2) did not grant the trial court the authority to sua sponte address the issue of personal jurisdiction because only respondent could raise the issue.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said. “The plain language of MCL 552.2301(2) and MCL 552.2306 is mandatory, not permissive, and makes it clear that the trial court has an obligation to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over the parties before an out-of-court custody order can be registered. Therefore, the trial court did not err by addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction sua sponte.”

The plaintiff also argued the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction over the defendant under Michigan’s long-arm statute, MCL 600.705.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said. The plaintiff “has not shown that any of [the defendant’s] actions would have allowed the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over [him] under either subsection of (1) or (2) of Michigan’s long-arm statute.”

MSC Order

In its order, the Supreme Court said the Court of Appeals wrongly affirmed the trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant under Michigan’s long-arm statute.

“The circuit court improperly construed MCL 552.2201(1)(h) of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and failed to conduct the necessary minimum contacts analysis prior to determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction,” the high court said. “Accordingly, it was premature for the circuit court to vacate the registration of the out-of-state support order, change the case-type code from ‘UN’ to ‘UF’ to allow enforcement proceedings to take place in a different tribunal that has personal jurisdiction over the [defendant] and to deny the [plaintiff’s] request for attorney fees before performing the proper legal analysis.”

Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s “catch-all provision” regarding personal jurisdiction, “a forum state may exercise personal jurisdiction over petitions for enforcement of out-of-state support claims, such as the [plaintiff’s] claim for child support under New York State law, if ‘[t]here is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction,’” the justices said. “A constitutional basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction exists where a [defendant] has sufficient minimum contacts with Michigan. … Traditionally, personal jurisdiction involves ‘a two-fold inquiry: (1) do the [defendant’s] acts fall within the applicable long-arm statute, and (2) does the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] comport with due process?’”

The statute’s “catchall provision … only requires a court to consider constitutional due process, the two inquiries collapse into a single inquiry regarding minimum contacts,” the Supreme Court said. “Accordingly, the lower courts’ analyses under Michigan’s long-arm statute, MCL 600.705, and its independent statutory basis for personal jurisdiction was unnecessary - personal jurisdiction may exist regardless of whether the [defendant’s] actions satisfy any provision of MCL 600.705.”

The trial court “was obligated under MCL 552.2201(1)(h) to analyze whether due process is satisfied here by determining ‘whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between a nonresident [defendant] and the state to support due process requirements of limited personal jurisdiction,’” the high court stated. “The minimum contacts test has three parts: First, the [defendant] must purposefully act in or towards the state, thus availing himself of the protection and benefits of its laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the [defendant’s] activities in the state. Third, the [defendant’s] activities must be substantially connected with the state so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would be reasonable.”

Here, the trial court “did not undertake this required minimum contacts analysis and therefore erred,” the Supreme Court concluded. “In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED ….”