In re K.D. Simpson, Minor

• Docket No. 368248

• Published October 1, 2024 (Gadola, K.F. Kelly, Mariani)

• Kent County Circuit Court

Holding: The Trial Court did not clearly err when it determined termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and that termination was in the minor child, KS’, best interests.

Facts: KS was born in September 2022 and both he and Respondent-Mother were positive for cocaine at the time of his birth. Petitioner, DHHS, contacted Respondent-Father, who stated he and Respondent-Mother intended to take KS out-of-state to California upon KS’ discharge from the hospital. DHHS filed for emergency jurisdiction to take KS into protective custody and the Trial Court granted their request. The Trial Court eventually placed KS with Respondent-Mother’s cousin, who was fostering KS’ three half-siblings.

From October 2022 until September 2023, Respondent-Father regularly visited with KS in a supervised setting and was able to bond with him, however, Respondent-Father also regularly turned in positive drug screens for cocaine, alcohol, marijuana, and fentanyl. Respondent-Father never admitted to using drugs, instead claiming that he continued to test positive due to his living situation in a one-bedroom apartment with Respondent-Mother and two other adult men. Respondent-Father claimed that the drug use of those around him and the presence of drugs in his home caused him to continue to test positive. In September 2023, as Respondent-Father had made no progress to address his substance usage or to obtain appropriate housing, DHHS petitioned to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights. The Trial Court determined that termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and that termination was in KS’ best interests. Respondent-Father appealed.

Key Appellate Rulings:

Trial court’s decision to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights was not conditioned on Respondent-Father admitting to drug use, thus Respondent-Father’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.

Respondent-Father argued, based on the Court of Appeals ruling in In re Blakeman, 326 Mich App 318 (2018), that the Trial Court was requiring Respondent-Father to violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by requiring Respondent-Father to admit to his drug use before the Trial Court would allow Respondent-Father to reunify with KS. In support of his argument, Respondent-Father cited several statements made by the Trial Court which illustrated the Trial Court’s desire for Respondent-Father to “get the substance abuse acknowledged first” before Respondent-Father could “engage in some sort of treatment for substance abuse” in order to avoid termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 

The Court of Appeals disagreed with Respondent-Father’s argument as “[r]egardless of whether a hypothetical admission by respondent-father that he used drugs would tend to incriminate him, respondent-father has not shown he was compelled to provide any such admission in a way that would violate the Fifth Amendment.” The Court held that the Trial Court’s concern was not with Respondent-Father admitting to using drugs “but with him addressing the substance-abuse problem that the evidence overwhelmingly showed.” The Court distinguished this case from Blakeman noting that Respondent-Father was not forced to choose between an incriminating admission and termination of his parental rights and held “the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights focused on the fact that he was unable to demonstrate improvement with overcoming addiction, a barrier to reunification.” Respondent-Father also did not address the second part of the Trial Court’s finding under sub-section (c)(i), which concerned Respondent-Father’s lack of suitable housing. As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights.

Because no one petitioned for a guardianship, and because guardianships are less permanent than adoption, the Trial Court did not clearly err in finding termination was in KS’ best interests, despite his placement with relatives and Respondent-Father’s bond with him. 

Respondent-Father also argued that the Trial Court erred by failing to consider a guardianship of KS, as a guardianship would provide for KS’ stability and permanence until such a time as Respondent-Father could address his substance-use and housing issues. 

The Court of Appeals noted that the Trial Court had considered Respondent-Father’s bond with KS, KS’ placement with a relative, and the potential for guardianship, however, the Trial Court concluded “that adoption, not guardianship, was in KS’s best interests, because it would allow the adoptive parent to “have control over what happens with the child” and avoid having the guardianship challenged in the future, which may affect the child’s permanency, stability, and finality.” The Court of Appeals also noted that no petition for guardianship had been filed throughout the proceeding, and that “there was the possibility that the child would be involved in an ongoing exchange between two homes, only one of which had been shown to be safe for the child, thereby affecting the child’s permanency, stability, and finality.” The Court of Appeals found no clear error in the Trial Court’s finding that, given Respondent-Father’s current lifestyle and resistance to changing said lifestyle, Respondent-Father could not provide for KS’ permanency, stability, and finality, and that the Trial Court’s determination that termination and adoption were in KS’ best interests was similarly not clearly erroneous.