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Termination Of Mom’s Rights Reversed For Closer Look At Best Interest Factors

While the trial court properly held there was a statutory basis to terminate the respondent-mother’s parental rights, “we reverse and remand for further proceedings on whether termination is in the children’s best interests,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

The respondent-mother in In re Hogan, Minors (Docket No. 365923) argued the trial court wrongly held there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that 1) statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights existed and 2) termination was in the best interests of her children. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the statutory grounds for termination, but reversed as to the finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.

“[I]t is our opinion that the trial court did not adequately consider that mother’s intellectual disability means that she will need more time and more resources than the average person in order to overcome the conditions that led [the Department of Health and Human Services] to file its petition for termination,” the Court of Appeals said.

Judge Michelle M. Rick, Judge Douglas B. Shapiro and Judge Christopher P. Yates were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Background

The Department of Health and Human Services (the DHHS) filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights to her minor children, ZT, LH and EH. The petition alleged the respondent was unable to provide proper support for her children and the home environment was unfit. The petition also stated that 1) the children suffered multiple injuries due to inadequate supervision, 2) the respondent failed to provide for her children’s medical needs and 3) the respondent had a history of dating abusive men. A second petition adding NH to the case was filed one day after the child was born.

The respondent’s housing situation was “inconsistent and unreliable” throughout the proceedings. The respondent claimed she was looking for suitable housing and that she was on several waiting lists. The respondent also had inconsistent employment, which was attributed to her disability, for which she received state assistance. Eventually, the respondent also obtained Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. The respondent was evaluated to have an IQ of 66, which fell within the “extremely low range.” According to the evaluation, she experienced deficits in verbal and nonverbal reasoning and ability, nonverbal processing, ability to problem solve, ability to be flexible regarding thinking, working memory, mental alertness, and ability to process and retain information. “The results of the evaluation made it clear that mother would need extra assistance and resources in order to successfully parent the children.”

At a termination hearing in Branch County Circuit Court, the respondent asked for more time to obtain housing and additional stability. Although the DHHS agreed the respondent loved her children and that she was consistent with her parenting-time visits, the agency expressed concern about her ability to supervise the children by herself because there was always another person to help during her visits. The DHHS also indicated that, although the respondent actively participated in most of the services offered to her, she made minimal progress toward her goals.

Several individuals who worked with the respondent during the proceedings testified at trial. The respondent also testified on her own behalf and agreed that her housing situation had been unstable. She explained that she was on Medicaid, was continuing services at Pines Behavioral Health Services and was in counseling. The respondent stated that she believed she had participated in every service that the DHHS had asked her to participate in, and acknowledged the only service that she did not complete was part of a parenting program that she voluntarily took on her own. The respondent further testified that she was taking classes through an organization called Beginnings Care for Life. Meanwhile, the lawyer guardian ad litem testified that the parties had considered placing the children under guardianship.

In issuing its decision regarding the statutory grounds for termination, the trial court emphasized 1) the respondent’s relationships, 2) the respondent’s evaluation and 3) the fact that some of the children had special needs and needed an even higher level of care. The trial court said it had “no doubt” that the respondent loved her children and wanted “the best for her children.” However, the trial court said the concern was that the respondent had not “gotten to the point yet where she can have her children, so how long do we keep this going for?”

The trial court found more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial disposition and the respondent had not rectified the issues that brought the children into care, satisfying MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The trial court further found that 1) MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was satisfied because, although the respondent received state financial assistance, she had still proven unable to properly care for the children and 2) MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was satisfied because there was a reasonable likelihood the children would be harmed if returned to the respondent’s care. 

The trial court then turned to the children’s best interests. The trial court “acknowledged, while it was not necessarily opposed to a guardianship, it did ‘agree that this juvenile guardianship would go on for a long time.’” According to the trial court, it was in the children’s best interests to have stability, permanence and security, and it was not going to establish a guardianship if it could not be certain the children would be returned to mother. The trial court found the children needed permanence and, as a result, it terminated the respondent’s parental rights.

The respondent appealed.

Statutory Grounds For Termination

The Court of Appeals first addressed the statutory grounds for terminating the respondent’s parental rights.

The respondent “was making progress on the majority of the conditions that led to the adjudication,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Unfortunately, there was no evidence mother would, with certainty, be able to obtain an apartment suitable for herself and her children in the near future, and mother herself admitted she may need an additional one or two years to be able to provide suitable housing and care for her children. Mother’s inability to maintain housing was a leading factor in the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights, and there was no reasonable likelihood these conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages.”

In addition, the Court of Appeals explained the trial court relied on the respondent’s psychological evaluation when making its ruling - specifically the concerns about the respondent’s intellectual disability, lack of awareness, distress and difficulty with social relationships. “[A]ll three witnesses admitted mother did not have adequate housing and was unable to provide a stable living situation for her children. The aunt also recognized how mother’s problematic relationships impacted her ability to care for her children, and believed mother would need approximately one year to prove she could provide stability for her children.”

The Court of Appeals noted this was one of the “difficult cases” that highlights the importance of giving deference the trial court under MCR 2.613(C). “The trial court had the advantage of observing and assessing the credibility of the evidence presented by all the witnesses and made its holding on the basis of these observations. Therefore, we conclude the trial court’s finding that mother failed to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), was not clearly erroneous.”

Children’s Best Interests

Next, the Court of Appeals turned to the best interests of the children, noting the “crux” of the trial court’s decision related to permanency.

“Addressing the best-interest factors, the trial court explained that the court contemplated a guardianship but feared that the guardianship ‘would go on for a long time,’” the Court of Appeals observed. “The trial court found termination to be in the children’s best interests because mother would not be able to provide stability and permanency for the children within a reasonable amount of time. … The trial court did not specifically touch on the matter of mother’s intellectual disability when ruling on best-interests, but ample evidence was presented in the record to paint a picture of how it affects mother’s life, interpersonal relationships, and ability to parent. Thus, it can be inferred that the trial court took mother’s intellectual disability into consideration. However, it is our opinion that the trial court did not adequately consider that mother’s intellectual disability means that she will need more time and more resources than the average person in order to overcome the conditions that led DHHS to file its petition for termination.”

Citing In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79 (2017), the Court of Appeals said the trial court record was “devoid of actual permanency plans” for the children. “Would the caretaking aunt adopt them, thus allowing for them to continue to have a relationship with their mother? Would strangers adopt them, effectively severing all ties with mother? Would the children be kept together? Would they be separated? In other words, what are the intended post-termination plans for these children? Answers to these questions would be useful for all involved at the trial court level, and would enable this Court to determine whether the trial court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of these minor children.”

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the best-interests portion of the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. “On remand, the trial court shall reconsider whether termination is in the children’s best interests and shall expressly reconsider placing the children under guardianship. The proceedings on remand are limited to these issues.”