Appeals Court: Dad’s Paternity Rights Properly Revoked

The trial court in this case properly revoked the father’s paternity to the minor child under the Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA), the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

The plaintiff-father in Kollar v Sparks (Docket No. 364420) argued that the Montcalm County Circuit Court wrongly revoked his paternity to the child, AJK, under the ROPA (MCL 722.1431 et seq.). The plaintiff specifically claimed:

• the referee erred in several respects by allowing an investigator with the Friend of the Court (FOC) to testify as an expert.

• the referee improperly admitted into evidence a report drafted by the investigator.

• the trial court violated his substantive and procedural due process rights.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiff, affirming the trial court’s decision to revoke his paternity.

Regarding the investigator’s testimony, “the trial court’s decision to allow [the investigator] to testify about her investigation and offer an expert opinion about the facts underlying the referee’s best-interest findings fell within the range of principled outcomes,” the Court of Appeals said.

As to the plaintiff’s due process claims, he “does not make any meaningful effort to establish that the trial court held an actual bias or that the trial court’s decisions were so one-sided that they demonstrated a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism,” the Court of Appeals said. “Accordingly, [the plaintiff] has not shown that the trial court infringed upon his right to substantive or procedural due process.”

Judge Michelle M. Rick, Judge Douglas B. Shapiro and Judge Christopher P. Yates were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion. 

Background

The plaintiff, Mark Kollar, and the defendant, Briana Sparks, had an “on-again, off-again” relationship. The defendant left the plaintiff in July 2020 and moved in with Jordan Lewis, who is a co-defendant in this case.

In November 2020, the defendant became pregnant and moved back in with the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in March 2021 and the defendant gave birth to AJK in April 2021. In June 2021, the defendant again left the plaintiff and went to live with defendant-Lewis. She took AJK with her. The plaintiff successfully brought an action for temporary custody.

The defendant moved back in with the plaintiff in July 2021, after accusing defendant-Lewis of domestic violence. Around this same time, the trial court permitted defendant-Lewis to intervene in the custody dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. As a result, defendant-Lewis filed a motion to revoke the plaintiff’s paternity under the ROPA. Because the defendant was married to the plaintiff when AJK was born, the plaintiff was presumed to be AJK’s father. A DNA test, however, revealed that defendant-Lewis was AJK’s biological father. 

A referee held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke paternity and found that defendant-Lewis established that AJK was born out of wedlock. The referee recognized that she could refuse to enter an order determining that AJK had been born out of wedlock but found that doing so would not be in AJK’s best interests. Accordingly, the referee recommended the trial court enter an order determining that AJK was born out of wedlock.

The Montcalm County trial court entered an order consistent with the referee’s recommendation and ordered reinstatement of a previous paternity action that had been filed by defendant-Lewis. As a result, the plaintiff’s custody case was closed.

The plaintiff objected to the trial court’s ruling and asked for a new hearing, which was held in September 2022. At the hearing, the trial court stated that it had acted, and was acting, in the best interests of AJK and noted that AJK “needed finality.” The trial court addressed the various ROPA factors and made independent findings based on its review of the record. After summarizing its findings, the trial court held it was in AJK’s best interests to revoke the plaintiff’s paternity.

The trial court further said it was appropriate to reopen the paternity case because the relevant parties to the remaining custody matter were now the defendant (Briana) and defendant-Lewis, as AJK’s biological parents. The referee conducted a custody hearing in the newly revived paternity case. The parties indicated they had reached an agreement on custody, with defendant-Lewis having sole physical custody and the parties sharing legal custody.

In November 2022, defendant-Lewis moved for entry of a final order in this case. The trial court entered a final order revoking paternity in December 2022.

The plaintiff appealed.

Expert Witness

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first addressed the plaintiff’s arguments that the referee erred by 1) allowing Angie Sattler, an investigator with the FOC, to testify as an expert witness and 2) admitting a report drafted by Sattler into evidence.

The plaintiff “primarily contends that Sattler was not experienced enough in paternity matters to testify as an expert in this case,” the Court of Appeals said, citing MRE 702, which governs the certification of expert witnesses. The referee “had considerable discretion in determining whether Sattler was qualified to testify as an expert, as well as a duty to ensure that Sattler’s testimony met the threshold requirements at every stage of the proceedings,” the appeals court noted. “After hearing her qualifications, [the plaintiff] conceded that Sattler was an expert ‘relative to custody’ but asserted that she had not worked on a paternity case and was therefore not qualified to offer any opinions on paternity. The referee disagreed and allowed Sattler to testify as an expert ‘in child custody investigation,’ which the referee felt would be helpful to the court in making its paternity determination under the ROPA.”

The plaintiff asserted in the trial court - “and continues to assert on appeal” - that Sattler had to be an expert on the ROPA in order to testify in the case. “However, [the plaintiff] cites no authority in support of that claim,” the Court of Appeals observed.

According to the Court of Appeals, the FOC had the authority to assist the trial court by investigating, preparing a report and making recommendations because a determination that a child was born out of wedlock implicates child custody. Therefore, “Sattler’s skills, training, and experience in these areas were relevant to determine a fact in issue – the child’s best interests –using the best-interest factors stated under MCL 722.23.”

In addition, “by conceding that Sattler was an expert in that area, [the plaintiff] waived any claim that she could not testify as an expert on those areas,” the Court of Appeals said. “That Sattler had not yet employed her special skills and training in such an investigation or report was a matter implicating the weight and credibility of her testimony. It had no bearing on whether she could testify as an expert at all.”

Therefore, the plaintiff “failed to establish any error in admitting Sattler as an expert witness,” the Court of Appeals said.

Due Process

Next, the Court of Appeals turned to the plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process claims.

The plaintiff “relies heavily on this Court’s decision in Grimes v Van Hook-Williams, 302 Mich App 521 … (2013), for the proposition that Lewis had no right to parenting time as an alleged father,” the Court of Appeals explained. “In Grimes, however, this Court did not hold that an alleged father has no rights whatsoever. It instead held that an alleged father had to comply with the requirements of the ROPA to establish that the child was born out of wedlock and that the standing requirements of that act did not violate substantive due process because an alleged father did not have a fundamental right to commence a paternity action, request custody, or request parenting time. … Regardless, an alleged father has those rights provided to him by statute. Because this case began as a custody dispute and Lewis alleged facts that, if proved true, established that he had the right to have AJK declared to have been born out of wedlock, the trial court could exercise its discretion to act in AJK’s best interests by ordering Lewis to have parenting time ….”

In particular, the plaintiff alleged the trial court’s decision to provide defendant-Lewis with parenting time violated his right to due process. “The state does not have to give special weight to a decision by a presumed father over that of an alleged father because both men have a claim to parent the child,” the Court of Appeals said. “Consequently, this state’s statutory scheme for resolving which of two men will be deemed a child’s father does not violate a fundamental right held by either an alleged father or a presumed father.”

Further, the plaintiff “suggest[ed] the trial court violated his right to due process by giving Lewis parenting time before it resolved whether AJK was born out of wedlock,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “[The plaintiff] filed the custody action and later stipulated to allowing Lewis to intervene (so that he could move to revoke [the plaintiff’s] paternity) as permitted under MCL 722.1443(1). The record established that AJK could not have been conceived during the term of the marriage, and there was a DNA test that conclusively established that Lewis was AJK’s biological father. That evidence showed a very high likelihood that Lewis would be able to establish the right to a determination that AJK was born out of wedlock. … The parties understood that the primary question would be whether it was in AJK’s best interests to refuse to enter that order. … On the basis of the evidence and the circumstances surrounding [the plaintiff’s] original complaint for custody and Lewis’s intervention, the trial court had the authority to enter an order allowing Lewis to have interim parenting time pending resolution of the dispute, if it found that it was in AJK’s best interests to have parenting time with Lewis.”

Lastly, the Court of Appeals examined the plaintiff’s various procedural due process claims, concluding that the plaintiff “was given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues of parenting time at every stage of the proceeding.”

Accordingly, the plaintiff “has not identified any errors made by the trial court that warrant relief,” the Court of Appeals held, affirming the trial court’s decision.