LAC v GLS

• Opinion Published July 25, 2024 (Rick, and Jansen and Letica) 

• Docket No. 365120 

• Kent County Circuit Court

Holding: The trial court erred in awarding Petitioner attorney fees associated with Respondent’s PPO violation.

Facts: LAC, Petitioner, was in a relationship with GLS, Respondent. After Petitioner obtained a personal protection order (PPO) against Respondent, Respondent attempted to forcibly remove Petitioner’s wedding rings from her finger during a violent argument. Respondent pleaded no contest to the violation, and the trial court sentenced Respondent to jail time. The trial court then granted Petitioner’s request for attorney fees despite admitting it could not find any published opinions in which the Court of Appeals held that attorney fees may be awarded in a criminal-contempt proceeding that involved violation of a PPO. Respondent appealed.

Key Appellate Holdings 

Attorney fees are not to be awarded as part of sanctions of a PPO violation. 

In Michigan, a court cannot impose penalties or costs in a criminal case unless specifically authorized by statute. Michigan court rules distinguish between the sentences available for criminal and civil contempt, and the criminal rules are different than those of civil contempt. Neither statute nor court rule provides an award of attorney fees as a punishment for a PPO violation. Instead, the statute and court rule offer two exclusive remedies for a PPO violation: jail time or a $500 fine. The Court of Appeals relied on an unpublished opinion, Eldridge v Eldridge, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals issued October 28, 2008 (Docket No. 278470), to come to this conclusion. 

The trial court erred in applying MCR 3.206(D)(2)(6) to the PPO case. 

Domestic-relationship PPOs are governed by MCL 600.2950 . The trial court, however, wrongfully ruled that MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) permitted it to award attorney fees to petitioner; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) governs cases involving divorce, separate maintenance, an affirmation of marriage, annulment, or paternity, custody, parenting time, or support of minors or spouses. MCR 3.201(A) (defining which cases are governed by Chapter 3.2 of the Michigan Court Rules). However, the majority concluded that because a domestic-relationship PPO action is not included in the plain language of MCR 3.201(A), MCR 3.206(D) cannot apply to domestic-relationship PPO cases.

Dissent (Letica, J.) 

The dissent, authored by Judge Letica, identifies published authority, specifically In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656; 765 NW2d 44 (2009); Taylor v Currie, 277 Mich App 85; 743 NW2d 571 (2007); Homestead Dev Co v Holly Twp, 178 Mich App 239; 443 NW2d 385 (1989); and a Michigan statute that supports a decision to affirm the trial court’s decision. Judge Letica noted “MCL 600.1721 does not make a distinction between civil and criminal contempt but rather requires a trial court to order a contemnor to indemnify any person who suffers an ‘actual loss or injury’ caused by the contemnor’s ‘misconduct.’” Judge Letica also would decline to adopt the unpublished case that the majority relied upon, in contradiction to published case law to the contrary, because that case found it was “not necessary to consider whether a trial court has the authority to award attorney fees in a case such as this.” Therefore, Judge Letica found the unpublished case lacks the force of an adjudication and would have affirmed the trial court’s decision.