Court of Appeals Reversed Parental Rights Termination After DHHS Failed to Prove Reunification Efforts and Notice Requirements
Opinion Published: January 2, 2025
Rick, Murray, Maldonado
Docket No. 369318
Calhoun County Circuit Court
Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s order terminating Respondent-Mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).
Key Facts: Respondent-Mother gave birth to the minor child, CW, in May of 2023 while receiving inpatient treatment at a substance abuse rehabilitation facility for substance abuse disorder. CPS was notified that CW tested positive for illegal substances and established an oral safety plan without filing a petition for jurisdiction, thus Respondent-Mother was never bound to comply with the safety plan by court order. CW and Respondent-Mother then lived with the maternal grandmother, and the case was transferred to Calhoun County, where a CPS worker updated the safety plan. This safety plan was again not binding due to the lack of a court order.
During a CPS visit in August of 2023, CPS found that Respondent-Mother was violating the safety plan. DHHS then filed a petition in this matter, seeking termination at initial disposition and placing CW in foster care. The petition did not explain why it sought to terminate Respondent-Mother's parental rights without making reasonable efforts toward reunification. The Trial Court then entered an ex parte order allowing DHHS to remove CW from Respondent-Mother's care.
The Trail Court authorized the petition at a preliminary hearing held on September 5, 2023. An adjudication bench trial took place over two days in November of 2023, where the Trial Court took jurisdiction over CW pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Following a three-day dispositional hearing, the Trial Court terminated Respondent-Mother's parental rights.
Key Appellate Rulings:
DHHS failed to plead aggravated circumstances in the initial petition requesting termination of Respondent-Mother's parental rights and failed to provide facts supporting their request for termination at initial disposition. Thus, the Trial Court was precluded from seeking termination at initial disposition.
When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, DHHS is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused removal. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). However, if certain circumstances, as outlined in MCL 712A.19a(2), are present, reasonable efforts for reunification are not required. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that DHHS did not even cite the provision in its petition seeking termination at initial disposition. Further, the termination order by the Trial Court does not cite the statute and erroneously indicates that reasonable efforts for reunification took place. Thus, due to both DHHS and the Trial Court’s failure to acknowledge the statute and the presence of this added duty when terminating parental rights at initial disposition, it was not proper for the Trial Court to terminate Respondent-Mother's parental rights at initial disposition.
MCR 3.997(E) does not allow DHHS nor the Trial Court to bypass the requirements of MCL 712A.19a(2) and terminate a respondent parent's rights without first offering reasonable efforts towards reunification unless a delineated exception to that requirement exists and is plead and proven.
The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the record, held that none of the exceptions under MCL 712A.19a(2) apply. Further, though the Trial Court failed to even acknowledge that an exception under the statute must exist, and any such findings would not have been supported by the evidence. DHHS cited to MCR 3.997(E), suggesting that “the aggravating factors in MCL 712A.19a(2) ‘only became a factor in the question of offering reasonable efforts towards reunification pending termination.’” Thus, DHHS asserted that it does not need to establish aggravated circumstances to seek termination at initial disposition, but rather it needs to establish aggravated circumstances to avoid offering reunification services during the period between when the petition is filed and parental rights are terminated, further arguing that MCL 712A.19b(2) is optional and DHHS “can avoid its protections by continuing to offer services while it awaits the initial disposition.” However, the Court of Appeals noted DHHS’s failure to cite any caselaw or statutes to support its position and stated that offering services while termination is pending is not enough. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that “the statute unambiguously provides that the efforts being made must be aimed at reunification, and this is impossible if the agency that is offering the services is actively working to terminate parental rights.”
Because the Trial Court failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements, the Trial Court violated Respondent-Mother's constitutional rights.
The Court of Appeals held that the Trial Court erred by depriving Respondent-Mother of her fundamental parental rights without adequate notice of what was expected of her, which is violative of the constitutional right to due process. DHHS failed to fulfill its obligation to obtain court jurisdiction and implement a formal written court-approved service plan by implementing an oral safety plan that was never submitted to nor approved by a court. DHHS sought termination due to Respondent-Mother's failure to comply with this safety plan, despite the fact that Respondent-Mother was not obligated to comply with it. No written plans were actually conceived until after DHHS filed its petition with the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals emphasized “the importance of preparing a written service plan that is given to the parties and placed in the record” in order to achieve clarity of the record and comply with the constitutional rights afforded to parents.
Judge Murray’s Concurrence and Partial Dissent
Judge Murray concurred with the majority that the Trial Court erred by terminating Respondent-Mother's parental rights without first requiring reasonable efforts be expended towards reunification, as none of the statutory exceptions to that requirement applied. However, Judge Murray disagreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the constitutional issues, finding that there is no reason to address whether the termination of Respondent-Mother's rights in this case was violative of her constitutional right to due process. Judge Murray argued the statutory ground suffices to properly resolve the appeal, so there is no reason to further address whether the order also violates Respondent-Mother's due process right.
