Justices To Examine Whether COA Correctly Decided In re Hockett, Minor

The Michigan Supreme Court is set to determine whether the Michigan Court of Appeals properly decided In re Hockett, Minor. Hockett, a published and binding opinion from October 2021, concerns whether a trial court had sufficient statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over a minor child who has mental health issues.

The MSC justices will review Hockett during upcoming oral arguments in In re Holbrook, Minor, which has facts similar to Hockett. (See, “MSC To Address Whether Trial Court Properly Took Jurisdiction Over Child, Speaker Law Blog, Feb. 15, 2023.)

The Court of Appeals ruled in Hockett that the Wayne County trial court correctly held there was enough evidence to exercise jurisdiction over the respondent’s child, NRH, pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1). That statute says:

“The court has the following authority and jurisdiction: …

(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age found within the county:

(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. …”

Oral arguments in Holbrook were initially scheduled for March 2, 2023. However, according to the Supreme Court website, the case has been “adjourned from call” and “will be rescheduled for argument in April.”

COA Hockett Ruling

Court of Appeals Judge Cynthia Diane Stephens wrote the three-page Hockett opinion (Docket No. 353132). Judge Christopher M. Murry and Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly joined the decision.

The Court of Appeals held in Hockett that the trial court had statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over the respondent’s child, NRH, pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1). According to the panel, the trial court’s ruling was appropriate in light of NRH’s special needs and the respondent’s homelessness.

“The trial court held that respondent ‘failed to provide proper and necessary support and care for [NRH], who was subject to a substantial risk of harm to his mental health and wellbeing,’” the Court of Appeals wrote. “The court’s conclusion was based on a finding that respondent refused to pick up NRH when the hospital determined him ready to be discharged. The trial court and this Court acknowledge the extremely difficult position in which the respondent found herself. She had no home. She had a child whose mental health issues were significant. She wanted the kind of care for NRH that he only began to get when the state assumed jurisdiction. While she is not a mental health care professional, respondent sensed, and later mental health care professionals agreed, that NRH needed more than respondent could give.”

The Court of Appeals also noted that it was “unfortunate” the applicable statute uses the word “unfit” to describe situations such as the respondent’s. “We note that ‘the underlying purpose of the statutory scheme is to protect children from an unfit homelife.’ … Unfitness connotes active wrong doing, which we do not see in this case. The statute, however, implies some understanding of the existence of parents who do not have the resources to provide for their children in the phrase ‘when able to do so’.”

The respondent was unable to manage the “complex mental health needs” of NRH, the Court of Appeals observed. “The trial court correctly determined that respondent declined to retrieve her child upon discharge. The court also correctly noted that respondent had the physical capacity to retrieve her minor child and did not do so.”

The Court of Appeals also emphasized its concern that “this mother, who took desperate action to get care for her child, is now labeled ‘unfit’ and listed on a registry for persons who acted to harm children when she, in fact, was seeking to protect her child. The scant and costly resources available for mental health care for children likely places other parents in the same situation as this respondent. We can only look to our policy makers for a resolution to this conundrum. However, ‘culpability is not a prerequisite for probate court intervention under §2(b)(2).’”

The respondent’s “admitted inability, not her unwillingness, to care for NRH’s special needs with the level of assistance she was receiving, along with her homelessness, rendered NRH’s environment a place of danger for the seriously ill child and, thus, statutorily unfit,” the Court of Appeals concluded. “In this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court was mistaken in finding statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over NRH.”

MSC Review

In its order directing oral arguments in Holbrook, the Supreme Court invited the State Bar of Michigan Children’s Law Section and Family Law Section to file amicus briefs addressing the various issues presented.

The Children’s Law Section stated in its amicus brief that it believes Hockett was correctly decided. “[T]he material facts of Hockett differ from the facts of the instant case [Holbrook] before this Court, such that the outcome in [Holbrook] does not dictate the same determination as the Court of Appeals made in Hockett,” the section wrote in its brief.

As of the date this blog was published, the Family Law Section had not filed an amicus brief stating a position on Hockett.