MSU’s COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate Did Not Violate Employee’s Rights

Michigan State University’s COVID-19 vaccination policy neither violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights nor was it preempted by federal law, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.

In July 2021, Michigan State University (MSU) required its employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. The mandate provided for religious and medical exemptions. The medical exemption  applied to employees with recognized contraindications and to individuals with disabilities under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). Numerous employees who had previously been diagnosed with COVID-19 claimed they were naturally immune from the disease and that it was unnecessary for them to be vaccinated. As a result, they did not comply with the vaccination policy. MSU then undertook various negative employment actions against them.

The plaintiff-employees sued MSU, claiming the university violated their constitutional rights to bodily autonomy and to decline medical treatment. They asserted that MSU could “not establish a compelling governmental interest in overriding the claimed constitutional rights of plaintiffs by forcing them to be vaccinated or potentially face termination.” The plaintiffs submitted expert documentation stating that the efficacy of natural immunity was either similar to or superior to receiving a vaccine.

The U.S. District Court, Western District of Michigan granted MSU’s motion to dismiss the case, finding there was a rational basis for the university’s vaccination requirement. The plaintiffs appealed.

The 6th Circuit affirmed in Norris v Stanley (Docket No. 22-1200).  

“MSU’s policy furthers a legitimate governmental interest in protecting public health,” the 6th Circuit said. “Thus, the policy passes rational basis review.”

Regarding preemption, the plaintiffs claimed that MSU’s policy was preempted because it conflicts with the emergency use authorization (EUA) statute. “[P]laintiffs argue this federal statute either preempts MSU’s policy or renders it irrational because it contradicts federal law,” the 6th Circuit said. “We find these arguments unpersuasive.”

Judge John K. Bush wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Raymond M. Kethledge and Senior Judge Helene N. White.

Rational Basis

The 6th Circuit first addressed the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim. According to the panel, this claim failed because MSU’s vaccination policy satisfied a rational basis scrutiny.

The 6th Circuit based its standard of review on Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905). “The facts of Jacobson square well with this case,” the panel said. “MSU has been empowered through Michigan’s Constitution to have ‘authority over “the absolute management of the University,”’ which shows Michigan vested its police power in MSU. …With that power, MSU promulgated COVID-19 directives that included a vaccine policy, enforceable through disciplinary action.”

Using a rational basis scrutiny standard, “we apply a strong presumption of validity when evaluating if the state’s action furthers a legitimate state interest,” the 6th Circuit stated. “Public health and safety easily fall within the state’s legitimate interests. … When analyzing the policy under rational basis review, the ‘reasoning in fact underl[ying] the [government’s] decision’ is ‘constitutionally irrelevant’ because the court ‘will be satisfied with the government’s rational speculation linking the regulation to a legitimate purpose, even [if] unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’”

Although the plaintiffs argued the research they cited showed that vaccinating naturally immune individuals offered little to no benefit, “that argument is not enough to strike down the vaccine requirement under rational basis review in the face of a rational basis for MSU’s policy,” the 6th Circuit explained. “The policy put in place by the state need not be narrowly tailored nor further a compelling governmental interest as it would need to survive strict scrutiny. Instead, to pass rational basis review, it is sufficient that MSU could rationally believe that requiring the vaccine for naturally immune individuals would further combat COVID-19 on its campus.”

The 6th Circuit continued by noting that the government actor - MSU - was the plaintiffs’ employer. “The government receives ‘far broader powers [as the plaintiffs’ employer] than does the government as a sovereign’ creating policies for all citizens. … Governments acting as employers have broader power and discretion because ‘government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.’ … Since public health is a legitimate interest and plaintiffs were MSU employees, the presumption of the vaccine policy’s validity is strengthened even further.”

Here, the plaintiffs had the “heavy burden” of showing that no possible rational justification for the vaccination policy existed. “They fail to meet this burden,” the 6th Circuit said. “In their brief, plaintiffs acknowledge that MSU has a legitimate interest in protecting public health but characterize MSU’s actions as an attempt ‘to exert control over individuals’ personal health decisions.’ … This effort to skirt MSU’s legitimate interest is unconvincing.”

Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not “adequately explain how receiving a vaccine violates a fundamental right, which would invoke a higher level of scrutiny,” the 6th Circuit observed. “Absent such plausibly alleged explanations, the complaint warrants dismissal under rational basis review.”

Because MSU’s policy satisfied rational basis review, no employee’s rights were violated and, therefore, “the policy is not an unconstitutional condition on plaintiffs’ employment,” the 6th Circuit stated. “And MSU may condition plaintiffs’ employment in a constitutional manner.”

Next, the 6th Circuit examined whether MSU’s policy was preempted by federal law regulating the distribution and use of pharmaceuticals. “Typically, only FDA-approved pharmaceuticals can be marketed and prescribed in the United States, … but emergency use authorization (EUA) is a notable exception,” the panel observed.

“Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that MSU’s policy is preempted because it conflicts with the EUA statute,” the 6th Circuit wrote. “The EUA statute’s relevant language - ‘ensur[ing] that individuals to whom the product is administered are informed … of [their] option to accept or refuse’ the vaccine - addresses the interaction between the medical provider and the person receiving the vaccine, not the interaction between an employer and an employee receiving a vaccine. … The statute is meant to ensure patients’ consent to the pharmaceutical they are receiving, but this does not mean that MSU cannot require vaccination as a term of employment. Nor do [p]laintiffs suggest that HHS [health and human services] has established any conditions forbidding employment-based vaccination requirements. The language of the statute also does not undo the fact that MSU’s policy is furthering a legitimate governmental interest, so plaintiffs’ claim that the policy must be irrational because of this statute are unfounded.”

Based on the foregoing analysis, “we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims,” the 6th Circuit concluded.