No Clear And Convincing Evidence Of Abuse, Termination Of Parental Rights Improper

The trial court erroneously held that statutory grounds for terminating the respondents’ parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

In the case of In re Legoas, Minors (Docket Nos. 364682 and 364683), the Oakland County Circuit Court exercised jurisdiction over the respondents’ children, BL and CL, pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) due to suspected physical abuse. The trial court then terminated the respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) - specifically, (3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury or physical abuse), (3)(b)(ii) (parent failed to prevent physical injury or physical abuse) and (3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if children returned to parent). The respondents appealed both decisions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to take jurisdiction over the children but overturned the order terminating parental rights.

“[W]e reverse the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights …,” the Court of Appeals said. “If petitioner continues to seek to terminate respondents’ parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing on remand, the trial court must make the requisite findings of aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a).”

Judges Anica Letica, Christopher M. Murray and Sima G. Patel were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Evidence Lacking

Regarding the trial court’s decision to take jurisdiction over the children, the Court of Appeals noted that, although there was “no evidence” the respondents failed to properly care for CL, “the doctrine of anticipatory neglect allows an inference that a parent’s treatment of one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children.”

Further, “[g]iven the lack of evidence the children had different needs, evidence of respondents’ treatment of BL is highly probative of how respondents will treat CL,” the Court of Appeals said. “The trial court did not clearly err in determining by a preponderance of the evidence that CL came within the statutory requirements of MCL 712A.2(b)(1). Because it was proper for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), we need not specifically consider the additional ground upon which the trial court based its decision. … Given this holding, it is unnecessary to consider whether it is proper to remand the matter to the trial court for consideration as to whether a new adjudication trial is necessary.”

Next, the Court of Appeals scrutinized the statutory grounds for terminating the respondents’ parental rights.

The respondents argued the trial court “clearly erred by finding that statutory grounds for terminating their parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence …,” the Court of Appeals said. “We agree. … [W]e will consider all the evidence presented at the combined bench trial and statutory grounds hearing when analyzing whether the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for termination of respondents’ parental rights. … [W]e will focus solely on BL’s humerus fracture.”

The Court of Appeals pointed out that in In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30 (2011), the appellate court held that termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii) and (j) “is permissible even in the absence of definitive evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator when the evidence does show that the respondent or respondents must have either caused or failed to prevent the child’s injuries.”

According to the Court of Appeals, the present case is similar to In re Ellis. “Indeed, like the parents in In re Ellis, respondents lived together and were the sole caretakers of BL, who is purported to have been abused and injured. However, as noted by respondents, unlike in In re Ellis, expert testimony was not presented to support BL’s humerus fracture was intentionally inflicted.”

Moreover, in In re Ellis, “it was significant the child had numerous nonaccidental injuries in various stages of healing, and there was testimony the child would have shown signs of distress because of his injuries,” the Court of Appeals explained. “Those facts allowed for an inference that the abuse would have been apparent to the non-abusive parent, given that it occurred on more than one occasion and over an extended period of time. … As noted by respondents in this case, however, the parties and the trial court focused solely on one injury: the fractured humerus. Therefore, there is no record evidence to support that BL suffered injuries before, at the earliest, September 21, 2021, and, as a result, it reasonably follows that the non-abusive parent would not have been able to detect any injuries on BL before that date. The record is also devoid of any evidence suggesting CL sustained any injuries indicative of child abuse. Indeed, it is undisputed respondents had not been involved in a CPS investigation before the proceedings at issue in this appeal. There is nothing to suggest the non-abusive parent was aware of the need to protect the children from an abuser.”

Therefore, because it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that either respondent abused BL, “the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i),” the Court of Appeals said. “Additionally, because it is unclear who or what caused BL’s humerus fracture and because the record does not support that either respondent failed to prevent abuse, the trial court also clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). For these same reasons, the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).”

Based on the foregoing, “[w]e affirm the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction,” the Court of Appeals held. “However, we reverse the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.”