Probate Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction In Mental Health Code Case
The probate court in this Mental Health Code case properly ordered the respondent to undergo a combined program of hospitalization and outpatient services, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled, finding that the probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.
In the case of In re JH (Docket No. 365530), the Oakland County Probate Court had ordered the respondent, JH, to attend involuntary mental health examinations and treatment since 2018. In this matter, JH’s case manager, Markell Smith, had petitioned the probate court to order JH to undergo a mental health examination and treatment after JH made online threats to employees and students at the University of Detroit Mercy Dental School. After a jury found that JH required treatment, the probate court ordered him to a combined program of hospitalization and outpatient services.
JH appealed the probate court’s order. He argued, among other things, that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the petitions and clinical certificates contained defects.
“We disagree and affirm,” the Court of Appeals said. “[T]he defects alleged by JH, even if true, did not strip the probate court of its power to hear his case. For this reason, we conclude that the probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.”
Judge Christopher P. Yates, Judge Stephen L. Borrello and Judge Kristina Robinson Garrett were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
On appeal, JH asserted the probate court did not have jurisdiction because the petitions and clinical certificates were defective and, therefore, should have been dismissed.
Addressing these claims, the Court of Appeals explained that MCL 330.1403 says individuals “shall receive involuntary mental health treatment only pursuant to the provisions of this act.” This statute “creates a framework for a probate court to order a person to undergo longer-term mental health services and hospitalization, MCL 330.[1]472a(1), as well as court-ordered, MCL 330.1438, and medically-certified, MCL 330.1423, short-term hospitalizations,” the appeals court said.
The Court of Appeals also noted that MCL 330.1434 provides: “(1) Any individual 18 years of age or over may file with the court a petition that asserts that an individual is a person requiring treatment. (2) The petition shall contain the facts that are the basis for the assertion, the names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses to the facts, and, if known, the name and address of the nearest relative or guardian, or, if none, a friend, if known, of the individual. (3) … [T]he petition shall be accompanied by the clinical certificate of a physician or a licensed psychologist, unless after reasonable effort the petitioner could not secure an examination. If a clinical certificate does not accompany the petition, the petitioner shall set forth the reasons an examination could not be secured within the petition. The petition may also be accompanied by a second clinical certificate. If 2 clinical certificates accompany the petition, at least 1 clinical certificate must have been executed by a psychiatrist. (4) … [A] clinical certificate that accompanies a petition must have been executed within 72 hours before the filing of the petition, and after personal examination of the individual.”
In this case, the probate court “did not clearly err” when it found that Smith made a “reasonable effort” to have JH examined and, as a result, “we disagree with JH’s argument that the February 15, 2023 petition was defective on this ground,” the Court of Appeals said. “At trial, the probate court determined Smith’s assertion that JH was noncompliant was a ‘fair interpretation’ and that the petition did not contain a false statement. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Although JH was initially willing to speak with a psychiatrist, he was unwilling to share his location with Smith or answer other phone calls. It was therefore reasonable for Smith to conclude that JH would not willingly attend an examination and court involvement was necessary.”
JH further contended the petitions were defective because the allegations against him were unconfirmed. According to the Court of Appeals, the factual basis for the petition stated: “[JH] has made threatening [YouTube] videos against students and employees at Detroit Mercy Dental School, wishing death. According to JH, ‘wishing death’ upon someone is not a threat.’” The Mental Health Code “only requires” that the petition “shall contain the facts that are the basis for the assertion” that a person requires treatment,” the appeals court noted, citing MCL 330.1434(2). “As the probate court recognized, the meaning of JH’s statements was a matter of interpretation, but the petition clearly contained the facts supporting Smith’s assertion that JH required treatment.”
Next, the Court of Appeals addressed JH’s claim that the probate court lacked jurisdiction because his examinations occurred more than 24 hours after he was processed at Common Ground, an Oakland County mental health agency. “If a probate court orders an examination, ‘[t]he individual may be received and detained at the place of examination as long as necessary to complete the examination or examinations, but not more than 24 hours,’” the appeals court said, citing MCL 330.1435(2). “Additionally, ‘[a] hospital designated by the department or by a community mental health services program shall hospitalize an individual presented to the hospital, pending receipt of a clinical certificate by a psychiatrist stating that the individual is a person requiring treatment, if a petition, a physician’s or a licensed psychologist’s clinical certificate, and an authorization by a preadmission screening unit have been executed.’ MCL 330.1423.”
Although it was “unclear from the record,” the Court of Appeals explained that JH stated in his brief that he was processed at Common Ground on February 15, 2023, at 6:11 p.m. and admitted to Havenwyck Hospital on February 17, 2023, at 1 a.m. “Accepting JH’s statement of these events as true, the examinations both occurred within the required timeframes. … Dr. Dhillon’s examination occurred before the hospitalization and within 24 hours after JH was temporarily detained, as required under MCL 330.1435(3), and Dr. Jasty’s examination occurred within 24 hours after JH was hospitalized, as required under MCL 330.1430. After Dr. Jasty executed his clinical certificate, JH could remain hospitalized throughout the proceedings. … Moreover, even if we were to find error in the timing of these examinations, JH does not demonstrate how such an error would invalidate the clinical certificates or the petitions, especially because both clinical certificates were executed 72 hours before the February 17, 2023 petition that was the basis for the jury trial and the probate court’s final order.”
In addition, JH claimed the clinical certificates were defective because the doctors did not read him an opening statement. “But the Mental Health Code itself does not explicitly require the opening statement,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Therefore, we conclude that the opening statement is intended to acknowledge and satisfy the physician’s duties when handling and disclosing privileged information. … As the probate court noted when JH raised the issue, JH does not cite any provision of the Mental Health Code that would invalidate the clinical certificates even assuming neither doctor provided an opening statement. The clinical certificates were not defective on this ground.”
The Court of Appeals further rejected JH’s claim that the reported length of the certificate and using a telephone to conduct the examination made the certificates defective. “[T]hese allegations do not make the clinical certificate defective. … Dr. Dhillon’s interaction with JH would have satisfied the requirement of a ‘personal examination,’ and the use of a telephone to conduct the examination did not violate MCL 330.1434(4).”
The Court of Appeals also said it was “unpersuaded” by JH’s argument that the clinical certificates were defective “because he was examined by two psychiatrists, rather than a psychiatrist and a physician or licensed psychologist.” According to the appeals court, “If the petition is already accompanied by one clinical certificate, the court must order another examination by a psychiatrist. MCL 330.1435(1). Therefore, the clinical certificates of two psychiatrists (who are also physicians) are always acceptable.”
Furthermore, “[e]ven if we were to conclude that there were deficiencies in the petitions, a probate court’s subject-matter jurisdiction does not depend on whether a petition for mental health treatment strictly complies with the Mental Health Code,” the Court of Appeals emphasized. “[H]ere, the defects alleged by JH, even if true, did not strip the probate court of its power to hear his case. For this reason, we conclude that the probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.”
Due Process And Fact Finding
In addition, JH contended the probate court violated his due process rights and erroneously made factual findings the jury should have decided.
“JH argues that he was not notified of the hearing, and the record does not reflect any attempt to serve JH with a notice of hearing,” the Court of Appeals observed. “In its order after the hearing, the probate court found that Smith made a reasonable effort to secure an examination, and ordered JH to undergo an examination with a psychiatrist and a physician or licensed psychologist at Common Ground. Although the court did not initially order hospitalization, the court also found that JH required an immediate assessment because he presented a substantial risk of harm to himself or others in the near future, and ordered that a peace officer must take JH into protective custody and transport him to a prescreening unit or hospital. … JH does not point to any portion of the Mental Health Code or the Michigan Court Rules that required the probate court to give him notice or the opportunity to be heard under the emergency circumstances involving a petition for a transportation order. … [I]n this case, there is no dispute that JH was notified about the hearing and jury trial on the February 17, 2023 petition. Therefore, the probate court did not commit a clear legal error to deprive JH of due process.”
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals rejected JH’s claim that the probate court improperly made factual findings about his need for treatment before the jury issued its verdict. “JH did not preserve this issue in the trial court, so our review is for plain error,” the appeals court said. “Yet nothing in the record supports this argument. And even if the probate court had made a finding that JH was a person requiring treatment after JH invoked his right to a jury trial, JH cannot demonstrate prejudice. The probate court held a trial on the issue and the jury issued a verdict finding JH required treatment. We further note that JH does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented supporting the jury’s verdict or the probate court’s disposition following the jury’s verdict.”
