School District Report Wrongly Excluded As Evidence

In determining whether changing schools was in the best interests of the parties’ child, the trial court improperly excluded a report about the school district where the defendant-mother wanted to transfer the child, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

The parties in Collins v Collins (Docket No. 363791) are divorced and share joint legal and physical custody of their child, AC. The defendant-mother lives in Brighton, Michigan, while the plaintiff-father lives in Jackson, Michigan. The parties have an informal parenting-time arrangement and, during the school year, AC stays with the plaintiff during the week and attends elementary school in Jackson. AC stays with the defendant on the weekends.

When AC’s academic performance started to decline, the defendant filed a motion in the Jackson County Circuit Court to change AC’s school district to Brighton. She argued that, despite multiple attempts to enroll AC in an individualized education program (IEP) in Jackson, the school “dragged its feet.” She claimed the school in Brighton could have AC enrolled in an IEP within 30 days. At an evidentiary hearing, the defendant sought to present reports on the schools’ academic performances. The trial court admitted a report on the Jackson school (Jackson report) but it refused to admit a report on the Brighton school (Brighton report) as “unauthenticated hearsay.”

Because AC had an established custodial environment with both parents, the trial court held the defendant had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that changing schools was in AC’s best interests. The trial court evaluated the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23 and found the majority of the factors were either irrelevant or weighed equally between the parties. The only factor that weighed in any party’s favor was factor (e), concerning “[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes[,]” which the trial court held weighed in the defendant’s favor. In addition, the trial court found that factor (h), concerning “[t]he home, school, and community record of the child[,]” was neutral.

The trial court ultimately ruled the defendant did not meet her burden of proof because she failed to present any evidence besides her own testimony that the Brighton school was better than the Jackson school. The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case.

“On remand, the trial court shall reevaluate factor (h) in light of the Brighton report and hold an evidentiary hearing to consider up-to-date information in its determination of whether defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in schools is in AC’s best interests,” the Court of Appeals wrote.

Judges Michael J. Kelly, Douglas B. Shapiro and James Robert Redford were on the panel that issued the unpublished decision.

School Report Admissible

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court:

• erred by determining the defendant failed to satisfy her burden of proof.

• abused its discretion by excluding evidence regarding the Brighton school.

• erred by finding that best-interest factor (h) did not favor either party.

“We agree the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the Brighton report, and conclude this error was not harmless,” the Court of Appeals said. “We also agree the trial court improperly evaluated factor (h) because it failed to consider the Brighton report. We decline to address defendant’s first issue because these errors necessarily impact whether the trial court erred in determining defendant failed to satisfy her burden of proof.”

Regarding the evidentiary issue, “we hold the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the Brighton report,” the Court of Appeals said, noting that MRE 803(8) is applicable to this case. MRE 803(8) is limited to “reports of objective data observed and reported by [public] officials. … There is an ‘inherent trustworthiness of documents prepared by a public official in carrying out his duties which justifies the public records exception[.]’ … However, this inherent trustworthiness is inapplicable if the record was prepared in anticipation of litigation.”

Here, the report the defendant sought to admit “was prepared by a public official, and there is no indication it was prepared in anticipation of litigation,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Defendant sought to admit the Brighton report to compare it to the Jackson report, which was admitted through the testimony of the Jackson school’s principal. The Brighton report is located on the State of Michigan’s official public portal for education data, which is designed to help citizens, educators, and policymakers make informed decisions regarding the success of Michigan’s students. … The reporting agency is responsible for collecting, securely managing, and reporting education data in Michigan, which is then published as the State of Michigan’s official source for pre-K, K-12, postsecondary, and workforce data, and is presented in graphs, charts, trend lines, and downloadable spreadsheets.”

According to the Court of Appeals, this data “is compiled, reported, and published by the State of Michigan to provide the public with a report of statistical information to consider when evaluating potential schools. This is precisely the type of objective public report this Court can assume to be accurate and reliable. There are no subjective opinions, analyses, or personal summaries published with the data, nor was the data prepared to use in any type of litigation.”

Furthermore, “Michigan public schools are required by the state to submit annual reports on the basis of their annual performances ...,” the Court of Appeals pointed out. “The information reported is the exact type of objective data that MRE 803(8) anticipated to be admissible. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit the Brighton report under MRE 803(8).”

Next, the Court of Appeals examined the trial court’s finding that the Brighton report was not properly authenticated. “MRE 902(5) states that official publications, such as ‘[b]ooks, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by public authority[,]’ are self-authenticating. As defendant pointed out, the Brighton report is published by the State of Michigan, which is a public authority, and has several insignias and a legend indicating this public authority. Therefore, the trial court also abused its discretion by failing to recognize the self-authenticating nature of the Brighton report under MRE 902(5).”

The trial court’s failure to admit the Brighton report was not harmless error “because it is possible this decision affected the outcome of the proceeding,” the Court of Appeals said. “The trial court asserted, as a major reason for denying defendant’s motion, that she failed to provide any evidence, other than her own testimony, indicating the Brighton school was superior to the Jackson school. Had the trial court considered the Brighton report, it would have had more evidence of the alleged disparities between the schools than it did solely from defendant’s testimony. With this information, it is possible the trial court could have determined factor (h) was not actually neutral, and, if the trial court were able to determine factors (e) and (h) weighed in favor of defendant, while the others were all neutral or inapplicable, it is possible the trial court would have granted defendant’s motion.”

Accordingly, the trial court “improperly excluded the Brighton report from evidence,” the Court of Appeals concluded. “Because this report could have impacted the trial court’s evaluation of best-interest factor (h), and, by extension, its decision regarding defendant’s motion, this error was not harmless.”