State Agency Did Not Act Arbitrarily In Denying Consent To Adopt Child

The Superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute did not arbitrarily deny consent for the petitioners to adopt a child for whom they had served as foster parents, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

The petitioners in In re TEM, Minor (Docket No. 359529) sought consent from the Superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) to adopt the child, TEM, after serving as foster parents for TEM and his sibling, EM. The petitioners initially intended to adopt both children, but later decided not to adopt EM because of EM’s behavioral issues. The MCI Superintendent denied the petitioners’ request to adopt TEM, asserting it was not in the best interests of the siblings to be separated from each other and because the paternal grandmother was willing to adopt both children.

The petitioners filed a motion under MCL 710.45, arguing the MCI Superintendent’s decision was arbitrary. They also alleged the statutory consent-to-adopt process was unconstitutional because it was void for vagueness and did not provide sufficient standards for the MCI Superintendent to follow.

The Dickinson County Circuit Court held a hearing pursuant to MCL 710.45 (“Section 45 hearing”) and found the MCI Superintendent’s denial of consent was not arbitrary. The trial court also held that the Michigan Adoption Code (MCL 710.21, et seq.) and statutes governing the MCI Superintendent, MCL 400.201, et seq., were not void for vagueness.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The decision, which was initially released as an unpublished opinion, was approved for publication in September 2022.

“We agree with the trial court’s determination that there was good reason to support the MCI Superintendent’s decision,” the Court of Appeals said. “This was not an arbitrary and capricious determination but one supported by thoughtful analysis and adequate investigation.”

Regarding the constitutional challenges, the petitioners “failed to overcome their burden of vagueness,” the Court of Appeals said. “The MCI Superintendent was not without standards or guidance.”

Judges David H. Sawyer, Anica Letica and Sima G. Patel were on the panel that issued the opinion.

Consent Correctly Withheld

On appeal, the petitioners argued the trial court erred by finding that the MCI Superintendent’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. They also maintained the trial court applied the wrong legal standard.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said.

Contrary to petitioners’ arguments, the trial court “did not ignore any specific period of time or refuse to review the nature of the MCI Superintendent’s decision,” the Court of Appeals said. “Petitioners misunderstand the limited scope of the trial court’s review. The trial court could not review the correctness of the denial, whether the MCI Superintendent adequately addressed past circumstances, or whether it would have done things differently. Michigan authority is clear that the court is to determine if there is any good reason to support the MCI Superintendent’s decision; if so, the decision must be upheld.”

In addition, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that good reason existed to support the MCI Superintendent’s decision. “The MCI Superintendent thoroughly evaluated four factors, and she determined that, apart from one factor, petitioners and the grandmother were equal. The only factor in which there was a difference was a factor that the MCI Superintendent and Michigan policy place a great deal of emphasis on: keeping siblings together. The grandmother, in contrast to petitioners, desired to adopt both children. Given that petitioners did not desire to adopt EM, the MCI Superintendent determined that the factors weighed against consent.”

The record also showed that the MCI Superintendent considered the petitioners’ outstanding record as foster parents and did not rely on inaccurate information, the Court of Appeals observed. “Furthermore, at the time of the MCI Superintendent’s decision, TEM had expressed a desire to be adopted by the grandmother along with EM. Many other personnel, including the children’s therapist, physician, and guardian ad litem, supported keeping the children together. This was not an arbitrary and capricious determination but one supported by thoughtful analysis and adequate investigation.”

Constitutional Claims Fail

The petitioners also argued that portions of the Adoption Code and statutes governing the MCI Superintendent were unconstitutional because they were too vague. In particular, the petitioners asserted the statutes do not give the MCI Superintendent sufficient guidance or standards when making a decision, thereby providing unlimited discretion.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said, noting that statutes are presumed constitutional and the petitioners had the burden of proving otherwise. To demonstrate that a statute is void for vagueness, the following must be established: “(1) it is overbroad and infringes First Amendment freedoms, (2) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct it regulates, or (3) it gives the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion in concluding whether the statute has been violated.”

The petitioners failed to show they held a protected interest for purposes of due process, the Court of Appeal said. “Petitioners acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has never proclaimed a protected interest for foster parents or prospective adoptive parents. They claim, however, that Michigan law does. This argument fails. MCL 710.24a(1)(a) does not create a protected interest; it merely provides that petitioners are ‘[i]nterested parties in a petition for adoption.’ Similarly, MCL 722.958a(2)(a) [the foster parents bill of rights law] does not create a protected interest ….” Meanwhile, MCL 722.953(g) “provides that prospective adoptive parents have access to the same resources within MCL 722.958a.”

According to the Court of Appeals, these statutory provisions “merely provide for foster parents and prospective adoptive parents to be treated in a particular way and to have access to various resources. Petitioners provide no other authority to support their position.”

The petitioners further failed to overcome their burden of proving vagueness, the Court of Appeals explained. “The Adoption Code identifies the factors that must be considered by ‘the court’ ‘[u]pon the filing of an adoption petition’ and in the subsequent investigation of the adoption, which includes the best interests of the adoptee and the prospective adoptive family’s background. … The MCI is created by MCL 400.201 and is ‘under the control and management of the Michigan social welfare commission,’ …. The MCI Superintendent ‘shall represent the state as guardian of each child committed’ and ‘has the power to make decisions on behalf of a child committed to the institute.’ … The MCI Superintendent’s ability to consent to adoption is governed by MCL 400.209 ….” In addition, MCL 712A.19c says the MCI Superintendent “or his or her designee shall consult with the child’s lawyer guardian ad litem when considering whether to grant written consent.”

Meanwhile, MCL 400.209(1) specifically says the MCI Superintendent is “authorized to consent to the adoption … of any child who may have been committed to the institute, according to the laws for the adoption … of minors,” the Court of Appeals pointed out. “The laws of adoption are contained within the Adoption Code and provide for various standards to guide adoptions, such as the best-interest factors, MCL 710.22(g), investigations into the background of the prospective family, MCL 710.46(1)(a), and consultations with the guardian ad litem, MCL 712A.19c. Moreover, the MCI Superintendent is overseen by the Michigan Social Welfare Commission, MCL 400.202, as well as Michigan courts, MCL 710.46.”

The petitioners “read MCL 400.209 in a vacuum,” the Court of Appeals concluded. “As our Supreme Court has stated, ‘statutes must be read together, and no one section should be taken in isolation.’ … By reading the Adoption Code in tandem with those statutes that govern the MCI Superintendent’s actions, they are easily harmonized and dispense with petitioners’ arguments.”