Trial Court Did Not Err By Granting Appellee’s Petition For Sole Guardianship
Opinion Published: August 22, 2024 (Maldonado, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Rick, JJ.)
Docket No. 368615
Saginaw Probate Court
Holding: The Trial Court did not err when it granted the Appellee’s petition to be sole guardian of the ward in question, AMMB, despite the Appellant’s multiple challenges to the order in question.
Facts: AMMB is a legally incapacitated 21-year-old and suffers from autism spectrum disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and epilepsy. Appellant is AMMB’s mother and Appellee is AMMB’s father. AMMB must receive full-time care and has always received the majority of her care from Appellant and Appellee. When AMMB was a child, Appellant and Appellee shared custody of her and were her co-guardians, but both parties recently moved for appointment of AMMB’s sole plenary guardian. AMMB was present in the courtroom for the first day of the proceedings but was ultimately excused after her Guardian Ad Litem moved to excuse her based on letters from AMMB’s primary physician and psychiatrist which stated that it would be detrimental to AMMB’s wellbeing to attend the proceedings. The Trial Court granted Appellee’s motion and denied Appellant’s. On appeal, Appellant argued that the Trial Court erred by excusing AMMB’s presence during the proceedings and ascertaining her preference in an unrecorded in camera interview, as well as raising a myriad of other issues pertaining to the Trial Court’s administration of the proceedings on the parties’ competing petitions to be appointed sole guardian.
Key Appellate Rulings
MCL 330.1617(4) allows for the Trial Court to excuse the presence of the ward from a hearing so long as the requirements of the statute are met.
Appellant argued, pursuant to MCL 330.1455, that the Trial Court did not have the authority to excuse AMMB’s presence during the proceedings because AMMB’s physicians did not testify and had not observed AMMB recently. However, the Court of Appeals held that MCL 330.1455 is inapplicable to this particular proceeding, as that portion of the Mental Health Code concerned civil commitment proceedings. Instead, the Court of Appeals applied MCL 330.1617(4), which allows for the respondent (in this case the ward) to be excused from proceedings on the affidavit of a physician or psychologist. While the Court of Appeals did not address whether the letters authored by the physicians in this case were sufficient to comply with the affidavit requirement (as the Appellant did not challenge the letters on that ground), the Court of Appeals held that the Trial Court did not err in excusing AMMB from the proceedings.
MCL 330.1628(2) does not require the ward to testify in order for the Trial Court to ascertain the preference of the ward nor does it require an in camera interview between a judge and the ward to be recorded.
Appellant argued that, pursuant to MCL 330.1628(2) and relying heavily on law in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings, the only way the Trial Court should have ascertained AMMB’s preference as to who she would like to be her guardian was through testimony. Alternatively, Appellant argued the in camera interview should have been recorded so that the parties could obtain a transcript of the conversation. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both of Appellant’s arguments. Based on the principles of statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals held that, because the plain language of MCL 330.1628(2) does not require testimony nor recording of the ward’s preference and because the phrase “to question” within the meaning of MCL 330.1628(2) is not the same as “to testify” or other legally significant phrases within the Mental Health Code, it was clearly not the intent of the Legislature to require wards to testify or that the ward’s preference be recorded. The Court of Appeals noted that the statute itself “suggests a delegation of broad discretion to craft a method for ascertaining a ward’s preference.” The Court of Appeals cited instances where the ward may not be competent to testify and that the statutory scheme itself “is to protect individuals who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation,” making it unlikely that the Legislature would require wards to testify even if they were competent to do so. The Court of Appeals also distinguished Appellant’s reliance on cases under the Juvenile Code, as the liberty interest at stake in proceedings under the Mental Health Code are significantly different from those at stake in, for example, proceedings to terminate parental rights and found her argument that the in camera interview should have been recorded to be “baseless.”
