‘Flawed’ Trial Court Analysis Mandates Reversal Of Parental Rights Termination Order

An order terminating the respondent-mother’s parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing must be reversed because the trial court’s analysis was “flawed,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in In re McMillion/Fagan, Minors (Docket No. 370224) claimed that aggravated circumstances justified terminating the respondent-mother’s parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. The Calhoun County Circuit Court agreed and terminated the respondent’s parental rights at the conclusion of the initial dispositional hearing. The respondent appealed.

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case.

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals explained the trial court made two “significant” mistakes. First, it “applied the incorrect framework when ordering termination of respondent’s parental rights” and second, it “made substantive errors of law” finding that 1) “reasonable efforts” were made and 2) termination was proper “at the initial dispositional phase.”

Judge Mark T. Boonstra, Judge Christopher M. Murray and Judge Thomas C. Cameron were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Reasonable Efforts Not Yet Made

On appeal, the respondent disputed the trial court’s finding that aggravated circumstances existed to terminate her parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. She argued that termination at the initial dispositional hearing may be pursued “only in limited situations,” none of which were present in this case.

“We agree,” the Court of Appeals said.

MCL 712A.19a(2) sets forth the limited circumstances in which reasonable efforts are unnecessary, the Court of Appeals said, noting the “aggravated circumstances” referenced in subsection (2)(a) “are limited to six events or occurrences in the life of a child.” These events are: “(i) Abandonment of a young child. (ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate. (iii) Battering, torture, or other serious physical harm. (iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb. (v) Life threatening injury. (vi) Murder or attempted murder.”

Here, the trial court “erroneously reasoned that this case could proceed to termination at initial disposition …,” the Court of Appeals said, quoting in detail the trial court’s reasoning for its decision. “Despite the trial court’s lengthy narrative, [the trial court’s] analysis is flawed in two significant ways.”

First, the trial court applied the wrong framework when it ordered the termination of the respondent’s parental rights, the Court of Appeals explained. The trial court’s analysis “suggests it misunderstood the process for termination of parental rights at the initial disposition. As explained, reasonable efforts are necessary in all cases unless an exception applies. … In cases where DHHS seeks termination at the initial disposition, courts must consider whether an exception under MCL 712A.19a(2) applies. If an exception does not apply, then the court must ensure that DHHS makes reasonable efforts toward reunification. In referencing the terms ‘reasonable efforts’ and ‘aggravated circumstances,’ the trial court found that reasonable efforts were established and that an exception existed. But if an exception existed, reasonable efforts are irrelevant and unnecessary. … The trial court’s analysis demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal framework to be applied to petitions seeking termination at the initial disposition.”

Second, the Court of Appeals said the trial court made substantive errors of law by concluding that 1) reasonable efforts were made and 2) termination was proper at the initial dispositional phase. “The trial court erroneously relied on the reasonable efforts expended in the 2016 case to find that reasonable efforts were made in this case. To be clear, DHHS made reasonable efforts in the 2016 case that resulted in a successful reunification. In this case, DHHS filed a new case that asserted similar allegations. The trial court’s misplaced reliance on the efforts made in 2016 in this case is contrary to the Legislature’s directive that, unless an exception exists, ‘[r]easonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases[.]’ … The trial court terminated its jurisdiction in the 2016 case, and jurisdiction in this case was established on the basis of new allegations. Thus, DHHS had an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification in this case – it could not use the reasonable efforts made in the 2016 case to bypass the statutory requirement that reasonable efforts to reunify the family must be made in all cases. On appeal, DHHS skirts this issue by simply stating that the trial court ‘[found] reasonable efforts had been made[.]’ DHHS offers no explanation of the trial court’s reasoning or why it was legally sound.”

Further, the trial court “incorrectly concluded that this case could proceed to termination at the initial disposition,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “Again, one reason a court may proceed to termination at the initial disposition is when, ‘[t]here is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances[.]’ … But … there are only six circumstances that permit a court to find that ‘aggravated circumstances’ exist – none of which are alleged in this case. … Thus, the trial court’s persistent misunderstanding and misapplication of the phrase ‘aggravated circumstances’ was patently erroneous.”

According to the Court of Appeals, “there are two methods by which courts can reach the question of whether there are statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3). The first method requires DHHS to make reasonable efforts at reunification. … If reasonable efforts are shown, then DHHS may petition for termination, and the trial court may consider whether statutory grounds were established under MCL 712A.19b(3). … The second method allows DHHS to bypass the reasonable-efforts requirement so long as one of the exceptions under MCL 712A.19a(2) is established.”

Here, “the trial court wrongly concluded that termination was proper under the second method,” the Court of Appeals said. “Thus, the trial court was not authorized to consider whether statutory grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), because reasonable efforts had not yet been made in this case.”

Therefore, “[w]e … vacate the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights and remand to the trial court for further proceedings,” the Court of Appeals held. “Although we vacate the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, all other orders remain intact, including the trial court’s order placing [the child] in DHHS’s care.”