Michigan Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Jurisdiction in Child Welfare Case Involving Parental Inability, Not Neglect
MI Supreme Court Opinion Issued: April 14, 2025 (Authored by Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement)
Docket No. 166509
Wayne County Circuit Court
Holding: The Trial Court did not clearly err in refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), as Respondent-Mother was not “able” to provide DVL with the proper and necessary support for his care. The Trial Court also did not clearly err in refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), as Respondent-Mother did not “neglect” DVL because Respondent-Mother did not engage in “negligent treatment” of DVL as defined by MCL 722.602(1)(d). The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Trial Court for reinstatement of the order denying Petitioner-DHHS’ petition.
Facts: DVL, the minor child at the center of this case, has been diagnosed with severe mental health issues, which make him a danger to himself and others. Respondent-Mother attempted to provide treatment to DVL in any way she could. In June 2021, DVL attempted to start a fire inside Respondent-Mother’s home, not for the first time, and threatened suicide. Respondent-Mother took DVL to the hospital, where he was held while Petitioner-DHHS attempted to find an inpatient treatment program. Just one day after DVL was deemed “non-dischargeable” by the hospital, he was released from the hospital having received no additional treatment and intensive outpatient treatment was recommended. Respondent-Mother refused to pick DVL up from the hospital, citing the fact that DVL “would pose a significant risk to himself, respondent’s other children, their pets, and herself.”
DHHS subsequently filed a petition in the Trial Court requesting jurisdiction over DVL pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Following several hearings, the Trial Court denied the petition, finding that Respondent-Mother had not been neglectful nor abusive. DHHS appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Respondent-Mother had been abusive and neglectful as defined by In re Hockett, 339 Mich App 250; 981 NW2d 534 (2021) such that the Trial Court should have authorized the petition under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Respondent-Mother subsequently sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu of granting appeal, the Court granted a mini-oral argument on the application and issued their opinion thereafter.
Key Appellate Rulings
As used in MCL 712A.2(b)(1), “able to do so” means that a parent must have “sufficient power, skill, or resources” to provide necessary care or necessary support.
Noting that the key enquiry under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) was whether Respondent-Mother was “able” but refused to provide DVL with the necessary and proper support and that statute itself did not define the phrase, the Court turned to the dictionary definition. “‘Able’ is defined as: (1) “having sufficient power, skill, or resources to do something”; (2) “having the freedom or opportunity to do something”; or (3) ‘having a quality or nature that makes something possible[.]’” The Court deemed the first definition most appropriate under the context of the statute. Applying this definition of “able,” the Court held that, although Respondent-Mother may have physically had the ability to go retrieve DVL from the hospital, due to the danger DVL posed to himself and others, Respondent-Mother “did not have sufficient power, skill, or resources to have DVL return and stay at home.” Thus, the Court concluded that the Trial Court had not erred in refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
As used in MCL 722.602(1)(d), “negligent” means “failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.”
The court noted that the term “neglect” was statutorily defined by MCL 722.602(1)(d) as “harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s health or welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.” As MCL 712A.2(b)(2) required “neglect” on the part of Respondent-Mother, the Court determined that there had to be a showing of “negligent treatment,” a term which is not defined by statute but could include “the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.” The Court held that none of these examples fit the current situation, so the Court turned once more to the dictionary definition of the phrase.
The Court held the most appropriate definition of “negligent” under these circumstances was “failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.” Applying that definition to the facts of this matter, the Court held that Respondent-Mother did not meet the definition of “negligent” as Respondent-Mother had been attempting to get DVL treatment to address his needs and Respondent-Mother’s refusal to bring DVL home “was precisely what an ordinarily and reasonably prudent person would do, given that DVL posed a danger to himself and others if taken home.” As such, the Court concluded that the Trial Court did not err in refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). The Court further held that, although the facts of this matter and Hockett were similar, Hockett was an affirmance, rather than a reversal, as this case was. This Court held that it was not necessary to overrule Hockett in that regard, as the Court in this matter was simply giving proper deference to the Trial Court’s findings, as required by law. The Court also recommended that, should DHHS wish to do so and deem it appropriate, DHHS could file a petition requesting jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(3), colloquially referred to as the “dependency” subsection.
Justice Cavanagh’s Concurrence
Justice Cavanagh concurred with the majority’s opinion and holding and recommended that “If DVL is still in need of services on remand, the [DHHS] may wish to seek the trial court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(3).” Justice Cavanagh wrote separately “in another attempt to draw the Legislature’s attention to this ongoing problem—that is, instances where DHHS seeks jurisdiction over an otherwise fit parent because the parent is unable to adequately care for a child with severe mental health issues, like the respondent-mother in this case.” Justice Cavanagh highlighted her similar concurrence in the In re Holbrook case. In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898, 899 (2023) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring).
Justice Bernstein’s Partial Dissent and Concurrence
Although Justice Bernstein concurred with the majority’s holding that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that jurisdiction was not proper under either MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2), Justice Bernstein wrote separately to address what he believed was an insufficient analysis as to the “culpability” element of MCL 712A.2(b)(2) and Justice Bernstein also disagreed that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) “may” provide an adequate basis to obtain jurisdiction over DVL. Justice Bernstein agreed with the majority that Respondent-Mother was not negligent nor neglectful, however, Justice Bernstein felt that a finding regarding the parent’s culpability was “central to an exercise of jurisdiction” under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Justice Bernstein held that In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24; 444 NW2d 789 (1989) was no longer good law and was negated by Legislative amendment, as at the time Jacobs was decided “neglect” had not been statutorily defined, and Justice Bernstein felt that the majority opinion in this matter and the holding of Jacobs cannot be reconciled due to Jacobs requirement of a finding of culpability on the part of the parent.
Justice Bernstein further explained that he did not agree that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) could apply to this matter, as there is no basis to hold that DVL was homeless as required by MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A). Justice Bernstein noted that, while other state and federal statutes had defined “homelessness” for use in those specific acts, the Legislature had not defined “homeless” in the context of MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A). Justice Bernstein thus applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the word, and he concluded that, under that definition, “DVL did have a physical dwelling he could return to,” and thus could not be considered “homeless.” Justice Bernstein also found that the majority’s suggestion that DVL was “arguably homeless” flew “face-first into the majority’s conclusion that respondent did not act in a culpable manner.” Justice Bernstein thus concluded that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) also did not support a finding of jurisdiction in this case.
Justice Zahra’s Dissent
Justice Zahra dissented from the majority opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s holding that Respondent-Mother “may be excused from refusing to provide care and maintenance to a child when “ ‘other barriers prevented [the] respondent from being able to take [their child] home, notably, the risk of danger to the family . . . .’ ”” In Justice Zahra’s view, the law of the State of Michigan did not deem a respondent-parent’s “subjective perspective of risk and lack of culpability” relevant to the question of whether a court should assume jurisdiction over a child. Justice Zahra further noted that, in situations where the parent is “entirely blameless,” DHHS still has an obligation to investigate and take action to protect a child. Justice Zahra further argued that the majority’s opinion “ignores governing statutory text and precedents,” and highlighted the Jacobs case as an example. Justice Zahra was also troubled by the Trial Court’s seemingly improper consideration of MCL 712A.18(1), which requires the court to consider “the “substantial risk of harm to the juvenile or society” when determining whether the court should exercise jurisdiction.” Justice Zahra concluded that the majority’s opinion “does nothing to protect troubled children, and it subordinates the needs of a child to a parent’s subjective understanding of their ability to provide “care and maintenance,” something not permissible under Michigan law outside of the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law.
Justice Zahra also expressed concern regarding the majority’s “indulgence” of Respondent-Mother’s claims regarding the services necessary to care for DVL and Respondent-Mother’s “categorical[] refus[al}” of any out-patient services. Justice Zahra also disagreed with Respondent-Mother and the LGAL “that declaring DVL “homeless” is the ideal solution.” Justice Zahra ultimately concluded that “a parent who causes their child to become homeless has in fact neglected or abandoned the child.”
