Michigan Supreme Court Expands Scope of Protection Under Whistleblower Protection Act

Stefanski v Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority

• MSC Opinion Released: April 14, 2025 (Clement, J., for the Michigan Supreme Court)

  • Dissenting Opinion: Zahra, J.

• MSC Docket No. 166663

• Saginaw County Circuit Court

Holding: A violation of the law for the purposes of the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act is not limited to statutory enactments but may also include violations of common law.

Facts: Plaintiff James Stefanski was formerly employed by Defendant Saginaw County 911 as a dispatcher.  He resigned after being suspended without pay for 90 days based on his alleged pattern of excessive nonscheduled absences. Stefanski alleged that his suspension was his disagreement with his supervisors regarding a 911 call. Stefanski believed that a 911 call for assistance following a shooting had been improperly coded and as a result, medical services were not immediately dispatched to the scene. Stefanski and others later reviewed the call and Stefanski disagreed with his supervisor’s conclusion that the call had been properly coded. An internal investigation confirmed his supervisor’s determination that the call was not handled negligently. However, Stefanski continued to believe that the call had been handled improperly and was upset because law enforcement was being blamed for the delayed response and the death of the shooting victim.

Following a meeting with the director of Saginaw County 911 wherein he expressed his concerns, Stefanski missed several days of work. He received disciplinary notices and expressed to the director that he was experiencing anxiety and stress because of the improper call handling. Stefanski told the director that he believed that the reason the dispatcher had not received any discipline was because he was also a supervisor which he saw as a “boys club”. Stefanski told the director that he “felt the urge to go to the Board” because of the way the issue was being handled.

Stefanski alleged that after his complaints, he was treated differently at work. He was not greeted by supervisors and was only called to the director’s office to discuss his absences. He further claimed he was given bad assignments and desk assignments he did not want. He went on medical leave in October but failed to return on his return to work date, instead calling out sick two more days. The director initiated a disciplinary meeting and imposed a 90-day unpaid suspension because of the unscheduled absences.

Stefanski resigned and sued, claiming he was constructively discharged in violation of MCL 15.362, the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act. He alleged that his complaint to the director regarding what he perceived as gross negligence in the handling of the 911 call constituted a violation of common law and thus, a violation of Michigan law under the Act. The trial court dismissed his complaint, finding that an employee’s report of perceived negligence or gross negligence by another employee was not a protected activity under the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed on review.

The Michigan Supreme Court ordered argument on Stefanski’s application for leave to appeal and directed the parties to address:

(1) whether reporting a violation of the common law, including gross negligence, constitutes reporting “a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law . . .” under MCL 15.362 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (“WPA”); and (2) whether the appellee was entitled to summary disposition on the basis that the appellant did not engage in a protected activity under the WPA, MCL 15.362

Following argument, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals, in lieu of granting leave.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that the term “law” in the Act encompasses the common law, based on the ordinary and accepted meaning of the word. However, the Act requires that an employee report a violation of “a” law, not just a violation of law.  The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether gross negligence is “in and of itself, ‘a’ law that can be, and was, violated.” The Supreme Court further remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether Stefanski’s actions constituted a report under the Act.

Key Appellate Ruling:

The reporting of a violation of common law may serve as a protected activity under the Michigan Whistleblowers Protection Act. The Act’s protections do not apply exclusively to reports of violation of statutory law.

In a lengthy dissent, Justice Zahra argued that the majority’s ruling deviated from fundamental principles of statutory construction by failing to interpret and apply the words of the statute in the complete statutory context. Justice Zahra concluded that the majority’s opinion violated two canons of statutory construction, the surplusage canon and the associated-words canon. Under the surplusage canon, the majority’s definition of the word “law” to include common law but also regulations, rules, ordinances and acts of Congress is so broad as to render the entire remaining phrase in the legislation - “regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States”  - unnecessary. Under the associated-words canon, words grouped in a list should be given related meanings. The majority’s definition of “law” violates this canon because the remainder of the statutory language only contemplates “written law” and not the common law as “unwritten law.”