Case Vacated & Remanded Due to Premature Determination of Whether a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Remained

In re Malloy Guardianship & In re Jenkins Guardianship

• Opinion Published: May 28, 2024

• Docket Nos. 165018 & 165020 

• Unanimous Opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court

• Jordan Ahlers of the Speaker Law Firm represented the Plaintiffs-Appellees

Holding: A professional guardian of an incapacitated individual must execute a power of attorney that complies with MCL 700.5103 to lawfully delegate to employees the authority to make any final decision to exercise a guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 or to delegate any other final decision that would alter or impair an incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations. However, a professional guardian need not comply with MCL 700.5103 to use employees to perform any other guardianship task or duty on the guardian’s behalf.

Facts: In 2019, Dana Jenkins and Mary Ann Malloy both suffered serious injuries in separate automobile accidents, causing both to become legally incapacitated. Darren Findling, Plaintiff-Appellee and attorney, was appointed guardian on behalf of Jenkins and as co-guardian on behalf of Malloy. During his appointment as guardian and co-guardian, Mr. Findling and employees of his law firm provided guardianship services to both Malloy and Jenkins, including visitation with physicians, case managers, the Social Security Administration, and both of their banks. After providing services, Mr. Findling requested reimbursement from Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant, pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a).  

After Auto-Owners refused to reimburse Mr. Findling for the services tendered to Malloy and Jenkins, Mr. Findling filed two lawsuits against Auto-Owners on behalf of both Malloy and Jenkins. Auto-Owners responded to this lawsuit by raising affirmative defenses, arguing that Mr. Findling did not comply with MCL 700.5103 and the proper procedure before delegating any tasks to his employees, therefore Auto-Owners were not obligated to reimburse Mr. Findling. Au contraire, Mr. Findling countered, arguing that he did not delegate tasks to his employees that fell within the scope of MCL 700.5103 and therefore did not need to comply with the procedural aspects of MCL 700.5103. 

After the Trial Court denied Auto-Owners motion for partial summary disposition (but granted Mr. Findling’s), Auto-Owners appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, held that, because the Legislature intended for “duties” and “powers” to have separate meanings under MCL 700.5314, a guardian need only execute a power of attorney when delegating “the legal right to alter the “rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations” of the ward.” In re Malloy, 343 Mich App 548; 997 NW2d 733 (2022). The Court of Appeals further held that Mr. Findling largely delegated only his duties under MCL 700.5314, and thus was not required to execute a power of attorney before doing so. The Court of Appeals agreed with Auto-Owners, however, that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding one instance where Mr. Findling’s associates attended hearings on behalf of Malloy. 

Auto-Owners appealed the Court of Appeals decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave, the Court ordered a mini-oral argument on the application and asked the parties to address whether the Court of Appeals properly construed and applied the relevant provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (“The EPIC”) in determining that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the guardianship services provided by Mr. Findling were “lawfully rendered” so as to be payable under MCL 500.3107.

Key Appellate Rulings:  

A professional guardian of an incapacitated individual cannot, without executing a power of attorney complying with MCL 700.5103, lawfully delegate to employees their final decision-making authority over a guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 or over any guardianship task that alters or impairs the incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations; however, a professional guardian may lawfully have employees assist in exercising a guardianship power and may have employees perform any other guardianship task or duty on behalf of the professional guardian without complying with MCL 700.5103. 

MCL 700.5103 uses the term “power” when prescribing certain enumerated tasks that an appointed guardian has. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that MCL 700.5314 did not provide an exhaustive list of a guardian’s “powers” under the EPIC and that the Court of Appeals correctly held “that the proper definition of “power” that is to be applied to acts outside those explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 is an act that alters or impairs the rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations of the incapacitated individual.” 

Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that when a guardian wants to delegate those “powers,” either those that are enumerated or those that fall withing the above definition of “power” to an employee, the guardian must comply with the procedural component of MCL 700.5103 and give a “written notice to the court” before a guardian delegates tasks to an employee that the guardian would otherwise perform. Additionally, once the guardian has properly delegated their “power” to an employee, the employee can only act with this delegated power for no more than 180-days. 

However, if a guardian delegates a task to an employee that does not fall within the scope of the enumerated or above-defined “powers,” then the guardian does not have to comply with the requirements of MCL 700.5103 before delegating those tasks. This includes allowing employees or hiring others to assist with the execution of a guardian’s “powers,” so long as the guardian retains final decision-making authority or has properly (pursuant to MCL 700.5103) delegated said authority to another. 

In applying their conclusions to the current matters, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding whether a genuine issue of material fact remained were premature. The Court thus vacated and remanded to the Trial Court for a determination as to whether partial summary disposition was appropriate in light of the Court’s opinion.