Revocation Of Parentage Case Remanded To Trial Court For Evidentiary Hearings To Make Appropriate Fact Findings
Opinion Published: October 29, 2024 (Gadola, CJ and Borrello and Patel, JJ)
Opinion Authored by Judge Sima Patel
Docket No. 367240
Calhoun County Circuit Court, Family Division (Judge Kirkham)
Holding: When a mother seeks to revoke an acknowledgment of parentage based on MCL 722.1445 – due to the child having been conceived by nonconsensual sexual penetration – the three-year limitation period contained in MCL 722.1437 does not apply, nor does the best interest analysis under MCL 722.1443(4) or (13). The case is remanded to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing so that it can make the appropriate fact findings under MCL 722.1445 by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals also retained jurisdiction.
Facts: The child at issue in this case was conceived through a teacher-student sexual relationship, when the mother was 16 years old and the biological father was her teacher. After mother gave birth to the child, the couple signed an acknowledgment of parentage (AOP), thus making him the child’s legal father. It is undisputed that he is the biological father of the child. The sexual relationship is a crime under MCL 750.520d(1)(e)(i), and the father was convicted and incarcerated for that crime after he plead guilty to three counts of CSC-III and witness intimidation.
In March 2023, the father moved to establish parenting time, which mother opposed. She then moved to revoke the AOP. She argued that she signed the AOP under duress. The father responded, arguing that the child was not conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration.
The trial court granted the mother’s motion to revoke paternity and terminated his parental rights. In doing so, the trial court took judicial notice of father’s CSC convictions and determined that those sufficiently proved the requirements of MCL 722.1445 – that the child was conceived as the result of nonconsensual sexual penetration.
Brief Statutory Background
Michigan’s Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA) provides several different ways to revoke paternity, depending on whether legal parentage was established by an acknowledgement of parentage (AOP) (MCL 722.1437), an order of filiation (MCL 722.1439), an order of genetic parentage (MCL 722.1438), or the marriage of the parents (MCL 722.1441). It also provides an additional method to revoke paternity when the child was conceived due to nonconsensual sexual penetration under MCL 722.1445. Unlike the previously noted ways to revoke paternity, Section 1445 revokes paternity even though the man is the biological father of the child. This is because Section 1445 was created in response to a federal statute, the Rape Survivor Child Custody Act (RPCCA), which allows rape survivors to seek the termination of parental rights of their rapist upon clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived due to rape. 34 USC 21303. Thus, the RPCCA provides a legal framework for survivors to protect themselves and their children from further trauma by ensuring that the rapist does not have custody or visitation rights.
Key Appellate Holdings
While this case is an issue of first impression, the holdings in the case are straightforward.
Section 1445 does not impose a time bar.
First, when revoking an AOP under MCL 722.1445, the three-year limitations period contained in MCL 722.1437 does not apply. The two sections have different statutory purposes, and a motion based on Section 1445 – even if it is to revoke an acknowledgment of parentage – does not need to comply with Section 1437.
Section 1445 does not require a best interest analysis.
Second, the best interests requirements of Section 1443 also do not apply to a proceeding under Section 1445. Section 1445 specifically addresses cases involving nonconsensual sexual conduct. The focus in Section 1445 is on the circumstances of conception, not the child's best interests, to protect the rights of survivors in these specific situations. Subsection (13) of MCL 722.1443 “directly conflict with the mandates of MCL 722.1445(2)-(4), which require revocation of an AOP if a court, after a fact-finding hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration.” The tenets of statutory interpretation require that the more specific provisions of MCL 722.1445 control the analysis.
Trial courts must hold a hearing to determine whether there is evidence to support the elements of MCL 722.1445.
Finally, the trial court erred by relying on the father’s convictions for CSC. The trial court cannot solely rely on the acknowledged father's criminal sexual conduct (CSC) conviction to prove that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration under Section 1445(2). While a CSC conviction can be considered evidence, the court must conduct a fact-finding hearing to establish a direct link between the conviction and the conception of the child.
Here the father was convicted of CSC for conduct that occurred in 2017, yet the child was not born until December 2018. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “Although a conviction of CSC-III, where the Legislature has mandated that the victim is legally unable to consent, can presumptively be considered evidence of nonconsensual sexual penetration, the 2017 conduct giving rise to the convictions in this case does not link to the acts in which the child was conceived.” Thus, the trial court should have held a hearing so that it could make findings under MCL 722.1445.
