Trial Court Did Not Give ‘Adequate Explanation’ For Reducing Appellate Attorney Fees

The trial court in this criminal case failed to provide an “adequate explanation” for reducing the attorney fees for appointed counsel, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled, vacating the trial court’s fee order.

The Allegan County Circuit Court in In re Attorney Fees of John W. Ujlaky (Docket No. 364889) appointed attorney John W. Ujlaky to represent the defendant in post-conviction proceedings. Ujlaky requested attorney fees of $4,606.72, but the trial court reduced Ujlaky’s fees to $3,406.72.

Ujlaky appealed the fee reduction, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for its decision to cut the fees he had requested.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Ujlaky and remanded the case.

On remand, the trial court must “either award the requested fees, or articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such fees are not reasonable,” the Court of Appeals said.

Judges Kathleen A. Feeney, Michelle M. Rick and Noah P. Hood were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Fees for court-appointed appellate attorneys has been a sticking point in Michigan legal circles for many years. To learn more about establishing appellate attorney fees, see attorney Liisa Speaker’s article “Extraordinary Fees in Court-Appointed Appeals” in the November 2019 issue of the Michigan Bar Journal.

Background

After the defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion and malicious destruction of a building in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, the Allegan County Circuit Court appointed attorney Ujlaky to represent the defendant in his post-conviction proceedings. Ujlaky’s legal representation of the defendant included various services, including reviewing the trial court record, meeting virtually with the defendant and preparing an appellate brief.

Ujlaky filed a statement of services with the Allegan County trial court. He requested attorney fees in the amount of $4,606.72, which consisted of $4,575 for legal services and $31.72 in expenses. According to the Court of Appeals, “The Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System standard fee for an appeal from a trial conviction in a Level II case is $75 an hour, with a presumptive maximum of 45 hours. In other words, the presumptive maximum fee for a Level II appeal is $3,375.”

Along with his fee request, Ujlaky provided an itemized billing statement that included dates, the number of billable hours and the $75 hourly rate for his appellate services. Ujlaky also filed a petition for fees in excess of the standard maximum. In the petition, Ujlaky explained that additional time was required because of the serious nature of the conviction and the issues requiring consideration on appeal. Ujlaky asserted that he spent 61 hours working on the appeal and requested $4,575 in legal fees.

The Allegan County trial court approved payment of $3,375 for legal services and $31.72 for expenses, for a total of $3,406.72. The trial court did not hold a hearing to address Ujlaky’s request for additional fees and, in the summary section of he fee request, the trial court simply said the “[r]equest for additional fees not justified.”

Ujlaky appealed.

No ‘Adequate’ Reasons Given

On appeal, Ujlaky argued the trial court abused its discretion by not adequately explaining its decision to reduce the fees he had requested.

“We agree,” the Court of Appeals said.

Citing Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne Circuit Court, 443 Mich 110 (1993), the Court of Appeals explained that, to constitute reasonable compensation, “the compensation actually paid must be reasonably related to the representational services that the individual attorneys actually perform.” And while a trial court “has broad discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable compensation, … it may not ‘simply deny’ compensation for billed services without an explanation,” the appeals court pointed out, citing In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik, 176 Mich App 827 (1989).

Further, a trial court must “either award the requested fees, or articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such fees are not reasonable,” the Court of Appeals said, citing In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich 890 (2015).

“This Court has articulated the following factors,” the Court of Appeals said, “for a court to consider while determining reasonable compensation for appointed counsel:

  1. The complexity and difficulty of the case and the time and expense of counsel which can reasonably be justified.

  2. The trial court’s policy as to compensation.

  3. The minimum standards for indigent criminal appellate defense services promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Administrative Order 1981-7, 412 Mich lxxxiv-xci. …”

Here, Ujlaky “requested fees in excess of the standard fee for handling an appeal from a trial conviction,” the Court of Appeals explained. “He provided an itemized billing statement detailing the tasks that he completed and the time spent on each task. However, the trial court simply awarded the standard fee without considering whether the request for additional fees was reasonable in light of the actual services rendered. The approval of payment merely states that ‘[a]ny reductions or changes to Counsel’s request are indicated above with strikethrough,’ and every item on the list for which Ujlaky requested additional reimbursement is crossed out.”

According to the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s only stated reason for not reimbursing Ujlaky as requested was a brief comment that said, “Request for additional fees not justified.”

“In the absence of any analysis as to why these fees were not justified, however, we conclude that the court’s attorney-fee award fell ‘outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes’ available in this case,” the Court of Appeals said. “Accordingly, a remand to the trial court is required. … Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

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