Trial Court Erred in Granting the Respondent a Directed Verdict During a Child Protective Proceeding Bench Trial
Opinion Issued: June 22, 2023 (Markey, P.J., Jansen and K.F. Kelley, JJ.)
Wayne County Circuit Court
Holding: The trial court erred in granting the respondent a directed verdict during a child protective proceeding bench trial because the court rules limit directed verdicts to jury trials. However, because the trial court would have declined to take jurisdiction over the minor children regardless of the directed verdict, the trial court’s error was harmless. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order declining DHHS’s petition.
Facts: In November 2021, Child Protective Services (CPS) began investigating allegations of abuse against respondent, and respondent admitted to physically disciplining her children with a belt. After taking the children to the hospital, respondent voluntarily agreed to follow a safety plan and to stop using a belt to discipline the children.
On February 11, 2021, DHHS petitioned the trial court to take jurisdiction over the minor children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2) and to make the children temporary in-home wards because DHHS feared respondent would not comply with her safety plan. The petition was authorized, and the trial court held a bench trial on November 7, 2022. Respondent testified that she rarely resorted to physical discipline and had not physically disciplined the children since the CPS investigation began in November 2021. The CPS investigator also testified and stated that respondent’s home was otherwise appropriate, and respondent voluntarily completed parenting classes. She also stated that she was worried respondent would not comply with her safety plan unless it was required, but she had no reason to believe that respondent violated her safety plan.
After the two witnesses testified, respondent’s counsel orally moved for a directed verdict under MCR 2.516. DHHS objected, stating that directed verdicts are only allowed in child protective proceedings involving jury trials, and because this was a bench trial, the Court Rules did not allow a directed verdict. The trial court noted that MCR 3.911 specifically references motions for directed verdicts pertaining to jury trials but found it “logical” that it, as the trier of fact, would be allowed to make the same ruling as a jury. Therefore, the trial court entered an order of adjudication declining to take jurisdiction over the minor child, denied the petition, and dismissed the case. DHHS appealed.
Key Appellate Rulings:
The trial court erred in granting a directed verdict during a bench trial in a child protective proceeding because Subchapter 3.900 of the Court Rules, which govern child protective proceedings, only allow directed verdicts in jury trials.
Child protective proceedings are governed by the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq, and Michigan Court Rules subchapter 3.900. According to MCR 3.901(A)(1), other Court Rules apply to juvenile cases only when the subchapter specifically provides, and MCR 3.911(C) incorporates the directed verdict rule, MCR 2.516, limited to “[j]ury procedure in juvenile cases.” Thus, the Court Rules specifically intended for directed verdicts to be available in child protective cases, but only in cases involving jury proceedings.
The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that the trial court’s dismissal would also not be appropriate as an involuntary dismissal. MCR 2.504, the Court Rule that allows for involuntary dismissal in a bench trial when, “on the facts and the law, the plaintiff has no right to relief,” is not incorporated into Subchapter 3.900. Thus, involuntary dismissals are also not permitted in child protective cases involving bench trials.
However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s error in ordering a directed verdict was harmless because the trial court would have declined to take jurisdiction over the minor children regardless. Because this case was brought under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2) and did not involve neglect, abandonment, drunkenness, or depravity, the relevant inquiry was whether the children were subject to a substantial risk of harm to their mental wellbeing or whether respondent’s home was unfit by reason of cruelty or criminality. The testimony in the case revealed that, at the time the petition was filed in February 2022, respondent had not physically disciplined her children for several months. Therefore, there was no risk of harm, the home was fit, and the trial court did not clearly err in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children.
