Trial Court Used Outdated Definition Of ‘Relative’ When Terminating Mom’s Parental Rights
Because the trial court relied on an outdated statutory definition of “relative” when deciding to terminate a mother’s parental rights, the order vacating her parental rights must be vacated and the case remanded so the correct definition could be used, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.
The respondent-mother in In re A.R. Williams, Minor (Docket No. 367165) pleaded no contest in Oakland County Circuit Court to terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j). Those statutory grounds for termination are:
(i) parental rights to siblings have been terminated and the parent failed to rectify conditions that led to prior termination.
(j) reasonable likelihood the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.
The respondent appealed, challenging the trial court’s best-interest determination.
The Court of Appeals vacated the termination order, finding the trial court relied on an “outdated” definition of “relative” in its best-interest analysis. In turn, this led to the trial court failing to consider “whether termination was in the child’s best interests in light of her placement with a relative in contravention of established caselaw,” the appeals court said.
Notably, the Court of Appeals also rejected the Department of Health and Human Services’ “invitation” to create an exception to the rule that “a trial court must consider a child’s placement with relatives as part of its best-interest analysis.” According to the appeals court, “Nothing about the text of MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) suggests that it is identifying a factor that is required to be considered when determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests.”
Judge Michael J. Riordan, Judge Colleen A. O’Brien and Judge Allie Greenleaf Maldonado were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.
Background
On July 27, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (the DHHS) petitioned the Oakland County trial court to take jurisdiction over the minor child, ARW, and terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The petition claimed the respondent had an extensive criminal history and alleged the respondent previously had her parental rights to two other children terminated in 2018 “due to serious and chronic neglect.”
In December 2022, the respondent pleaded no contest to the factual basis of the jurisdictional and statutory grounds for termination. The trial court entered an order of adjudication, exercised its jurisdiction and held that statutory grounds existed to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The trial court ordered that a hearing be held to determine whether termination of the respondent’s parental rights would be in ARW’s best interests.
At that February 6, 2023 best-interest hearing, the psychologist for the Oakland County Court Psychological Clinic who had interviewed and evaluated the respondent testified that reunification with the respondent was not in ARW’s best interests. In addition, a protective services worker with the DHHS testified that she had supervised visits between the respondent and ARW, and that she believed the child’s safety could not be assured while in the respondent’s care, as long as the respondent’s substance abuse problems continued to go unaddressed.
The respondent also testified at the hearing. Among other things, she denied telling the psychologist that her alcohol use was not a problem. The respondent told the trial court that she could refrain from further alcohol use if she was “provided with appropriate ‘instruction and therapy.’”
After the hearing, the trial court found that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in ARW’s best interests. Addressing the respondent’s bond with ARW, the trial court said that although a bond existed between the respondent and ARW “it was not strong.” Regarding the respondent’s parenting ability, the trial court found that it was “extremely low,” especially when the respondent abused alcohol, of which she had “a long history.” The trial court emphasized the respondent’s history of substance abuse “was one of the reasons that [her] parental rights to her other children were terminated ….” The trial court also believed the respondent “lack[ed] insight” into how serious her alcohol problem actually was. Further, the trial court pointed out that ARW had been placed with “a non-relative according to the statute and case law” (the child had been placed with her legal father). That placement, the trial court reasoned, “was currently providing ARW with the stability that the young child needed.” The trial court observed that the only statutory factor weighing against termination was ARW’s bond with the respondent; however, the trial court noted that “all the other factors severely outweigh that” factor.
Accordingly, the trial court held that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in ARW’s best interests. The respondent appealed, challenging the trial court’s best-interest analysis.
Wrong Definition Of ‘Relative’
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining that, before the respondent’s parental rights could be terminated, the DHHS had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests.
Next, the Court of Appeals referenced In re Mason, Minors, 486 Mich 142 (2010), where the Michigan Supreme Court explained that “a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination” under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), and said this was “an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination” was in a child’s best interests. “Failure to consider … this factor, the Court later elaborated, rendered the factual record ‘inadequate to make a best interests determination,’” the appeals court said, citing the Michigan Supreme Court’s order in In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012).
“Shortly after In re Mays, this Court in In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35 … (2012), held that a trial court’s failure to explicitly consider a child’s placement with a relative amounted to clear error requiring vacatur of the lower court’s best-interest analysis,” the Court of Appeals observed.
In the present case, ARW was placed in the care of her legal father, the Court of Appeals explained. “The trial court found that ARW was ‘placed with a non-relative according to the statute and case law.’ To reach this conclusion, the trial court relied on a former version of MCL 712A.13a(1)(j), which did not include biological parents in the definition of ‘relative.’” This definition of “relative” was amended and went into effect October 7, 2022 the Court of Appeals pointed out. Referencing Public Act 200 of 2022, the appeals court said that, under the updated definition, a “relative” includes “an individual who is at least 18-years old and is [r]elated to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or adoption, including the spouse of an individual related to the child within the fifth degree, even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce, the parent who shares custody of a half-sibling, and the parent of a man whom the court has found probable cause to believe is the putative father if there is no man with legally established rights to the child.”
Based on this updated definition, ARW’s father was “clearly a ‘relative’ …,” the Court of Appeals stated. “Yet the trial court mistakenly considered ARW’s father a ‘non-relative.’ This resulted in the trial court failing to explicitly consider ARW’s placement with a relative as part of its best-interest analysis contrary to In re Mason, … rendering the factual record ‘inadequate to make a best interests determination,’ … which requires us to vacate the court’s best-interest analysis and remand for further proceedings ….”
No Exception To Rule
Meanwhile, the DHHS argued the trial court did not have to consider ARW’s relative placement because, unlike in In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors, termination in this case was requested in the initial petition.
The DHHS claimed this difference was “significant” because In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors relied on MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), which says: “(8) If the court determines at a permanency planning hearing that a child should not be returned to his or her parent, the court may order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the court shall order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. The court is not required to order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights if 1 or more of the following apply: … (a) The child is being cared for by relatives.”
Although it was true that the present case did not proceed to a termination hearing under this subsection, “the DHHS does not adequately explain why that is significant,” the Court of Appeals said. “In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors relied on MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) … because that subsection makes plain that the Legislature considers a child’s placement with relatives to be a factor that can strongly weigh against termination. The subsection states that, even if a trial court would otherwise be required to initiate termination proceedings, it is not required to do so if the child is in a relative placement. Both cases extrapolated from this that placement with relatives ‘was an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.’ … Nothing about the text of MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) suggests that it is identifying a factor that is required to be considered when determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests. That was simply a reasonable inference that the courts drew from the statute’s text - if placement with a relative is so significant that a trial court can decline to initiate termination proceedings that it would otherwise be required to order, then trial courts should be required to take that placement into account when deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests. This reasoning holds true for any best-interest analysis, regardless of the manner in which termination proceedings were initiated. Indeed, nothing in either In re Mason or In re Olive/Metts Minors suggests that those cases cabined their pertinent holdings to only cases proceeding to termination under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), as the DHHS contends. We accordingly reject the DHHS’s invitation to carveout an exception to the rule that a trial court must consider a child’s placement with relatives as part of its best-interest analysis.”
Therefore, “[r]egardless of factors weighing in favor of termination, we vacate the trial court’s best interest determination and remand for further consideration of ARW’s best-interests consistent with this opinion,” the Court of Appeals concluded.
